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

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THE DOCTRINE

OF THE

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TRANSCENDENT USE

OF THE

PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY

IN

KANT, HERBART AND LOTZE.

A DISSERTATION
TO OBTAIN THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
BY

FRANK HUGH FOSTER.

LEIPZIG,
PRINTED BY ACKERMANN & GLASER
1882.

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INTRODUCTION.

The present age busies itself to a large extent with the problem of the grounds and extent of knowledge. One of the most important elements in this problem is that touching the principle of causality, which, since the time of Hume, has been the object of special discussion, and about which a variety of opinions have been held. The interests connected with this question are great, for, on the one hand, natural science does not satisfy the desires and impulses of man until he has arrived at some opinion as to the nature of things considered independently of our experience, and, on the other hand, theology seeks for faith the support which can be derived from rational arguments for the being and nature of God. In the strife of opinions, the best results are gained by those who are content to listen to the utterances of the wise, and accept that which has, on the whole, been found most capable of standing the tests of experience and criticism. And a consideration of the views of great men upon this topic will be likely to be rich in practical instruction. It is accordingly the object of the present dissertation to institute a comparison between the views of three great philosophers upon the limits of the application of the principle of causality.

The authors selected are *Kant, Herbart* and *Lotze.* Kant began the critical study of this subject in Germany, and has contributed more to it than any other one man. If we turn aside from the idealistic schools which succeeded *Kant*, as likely to give us little more instruction than is contained in him, *Herbart* is the next great German philosopher. Although Fichte was his immediate teacher, he was, in a large sense, a pupil of Kant, even though strongly opposed to him in many points. He is connected with *Kant*, and yet he shows us a contrary side of the question, while *Lotze*, who was formed very largely by the genius of Herbart, stands in still closer connection with *Kant*, and thus combines in himself to a great extent the excellencies of both of these writers. We have in the three, accordingly, not merely a trio of great names, but a group of philosophers, who, through their mutual relations naturally form the complements of one another, and whose systems may be expected to yield by comparison a mutual correction of error, and a mutual support in the truth.

Our definite topic is conveyed in the words: The Doctrine of the Transcendent Use of the Principle of Causality in *Kant, Herbart* and *Lotze.* — The language is from Kant, and is used in the Kantian sense. We are the recipients of sensations and perceptions which constitute a world of experience within ourselves. All philosophers admit, for some reason satisfactory to themselves, that within this world of experience the principle of causality finds a proper application. But our sensations are not themselves the things which may be supposed to lie at their base as their cause, and the question arises whether we can pass out over the boundaries of this experimental world, and affirm anything by help of our principle of a world beyond. If so, this would be to make a *transcendent* use of the principle (Pure Reason p. 292).

It is proposed, then, to examine the systems of these philosophers so far as may be necessary to give a clear view of their opinions upon this subject. We shall ask *What they teach,* endeavor to find *the reasons which they give* for their doctrine, *compare their views* with one another, and endeavor to *estimate the positive results* gained for philosophical science by the combined labors of the three. In this investigation our attention will be particularly directed to their views in reference to the two topics suggested above, the *Ding an sich,* to make use of *Kant's* term or the external cause of our sensations, and God. These will suffice to illustrate the doctrine of the three writers, and afford sufficient materials for criticism. But under the former head one department, that of the soul considered in itself, will be for the most part excluded, as affording nothing for our purpose not gained from the consideration of the material world, and as leading us into too prolonged discussion for our present limits.

We begin with *Kant.*

---

1) The editions of the authors employed are as follows: *Kant,* edition of *J. H. v. Kirchmann;* Pure Reason (R. V.) 1877; Practical Reason (P. V.) 1870; Faculty of Judgment (Urthk.) 1872; Prolegomena (Prol.) 1876. The text of the R. V. principally used is the *second* edition 1787. — *Herbart,* "Werke", edition of *Hartenstein. Lotze,* System, Logic 1874, Metaphysics 1879, Microcosm, 3d. edition, 1876—80.

KANT.

§ 1. The Problem of the Pure Reason is expressed by *Kant* in the following words: How are synthetical judgments a priori possible? The form of this question suggests the great ~~underlying~~ presuppostion of *Kant's* system, viz. that a priori synthetical judgments exist, and that the province of philosophy is to investigate their possibility. The words employed in it foreshadow his theory. Synthetical judgments are those which make some addition to our stock of knowledge. A priori judgments are those which are made independently and anticipatory of experience, being contributed by those principles of the mind by which experience is made. If there are such a priori elements of knowledge in the mind it is important to have a criterion by which they may be known, and this is given by *Kant* in the proposition that such elements bear marks of *necessity* and *universality*. The single proof suggested for this proposition is that experience never confers upon its judgments either of these distinguishing marks (p. 47 f.).

§ 2. Passing now to the solution of his problem, *Kant* takes up the question: How are pure mathematics possible? And here we need to delay with him long enough to notice some peculiar elements of his doctrine. Space and time are shown to be intuitions, and not concepts, and the proof that they are a priori, rests for the most part upon the fact that they bear the marks of a priori origin, necessity and universality. It is not necessary that we should dwell upon the process of proof by which *Kant* comes to the conclusion that space and time, although a priori, are *empirically real*. But it is of great importance to us, as illustrative of our theme, and preparing us for the consideration of what more closely concerns us, to observe the *method of proof* by which *Kant* arrives at the conclusion that space and time are *transcendentally ideal*, that is to say, "that they are nothing, so soon as we remove the condition of the possibility of experience and consider them as something which belongs to things in themselves" (p. 79). There seem to be but two arguments advanced for this conclusion. The first (pp. 78. 83.) is best stated in respect to space. It is: — "Neither absolute nor relative limitations can be intuited before the existence of the things to which they belong, and consequently they cannot be intuited a priori". It is, to be sure, no answer to this argument to say that *Kant* has the mature man in mind, and that it is not true that a mind which had never had any experience, as for example that of an infant, would have this clear intuition of time and space of which *Kant* speaks (This is the reply of the empirical school.). *Kant* is speaking of *logical*, and not *historical* relations. Logically the intuition of space may go before that of the objects, though *Kant* has not proved that this is the fact, because he has not proved the a priori character of all intuitions and concepts which possess the marks of necessity and universality. Granting him this point however, the proposition which he advances is not necessarily true. Absolute and relative conditions *as such* cannot be intuited before the existence of their objects, but is there any reason to reject the possibility of a priori intuition which shall exactly *correspond* to absolute or relative conditions? The proposition advanced excludes this alternative, but it does so without sufficient ground, and we shall see later that when *Kant* himself recurs to this possibility, he does not satisfactorily refute it.

The second of the two arguments involves essentially the same error. *Kant* says (p. 78): "We cannot make the special conditions of the sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things". The idea seems to be that there are two sets of elements contributing to form an object, from two different sources, sensations from the *Ding an sich*, and the forms of intuition, space and time, from the mind. What the one contributes, we cannot affirm to be contributed also by the other. This is true, but it is far from the positive assertion that *Kant* makes in defining transcendental ideality. Here he seems to advance a step further and say: What the one contributes the other *does not*. Undoubtedly he thought so, and it may have seemed to him that the law of parsimony demanded such a conclusion. But he never makes even this explanation of the process of his mind in the matter. And so the judgment we pass upon the argument must be unfavorable. *Kant* has not made out the transcendental ideality of space and time.

§ 3. Having thus gained a general view of *Kant's* method of reasoning, we are now prepared to approach more closely our particular topic. We find the principle of causality proved and developed in the "transcendental Analytic". Having adopted the ordinary division of judgments in common logic, which is exhaustive of the whole faculty of judgment, as his clue in discovering the various operations of the mind in its treatment of the rough material of knowledge given it in its sensations and perceptions, *Kant* lays down a table of categories, among which occurs that of Causality and Dependence. From this is subsequently developed the principle of causality. We will follow the steps of the deduction, or derivation and justification of his categories which *Kant* gives till we arrive finally at the deduction of the principle of causality itself.

The a priori character of these categories is an object of immediate certainty to *Kant,* because they possess the characteristics of universality and necessity. From this standpoint all that is necessary is to show how they may be applied to objects, and this will justify their claims to tell us something about objects a priori. There are, now only two ways in which these concepts can be applied to objects so that category and object shall maintain a necessary relation to each other. Either the objects must make the concepts possible, or the concepts the objects. The former is not a possible case, for then the concept would be empirical, and not a priori, as it is in fact. If then the concepts have any necessary relations to the objects, it must be in the latter way, that is, they must make the objects possible. The whole idea of the deduction is therefore to show that the concepts or categories make experience possible (p. 135). It proceeds accordingly by the following steps.

(a). When a manifold of intuition is given to us in the forms of space and time, there is at first no *unity* in it. If we receive the impression of redness, there is no *object* which we can call a *red object,* until we have proceeded, by mentally passing from one point to another of the impression as given us in space, to combine the different elements of the impression into a whole. This process *Kant* calls a *synthesis,* and it is a spontaneous act of the mind. This operation is accordingly the necessary condition of the existence of an object in the mind (p. 137 ff.).

(b). Through this synthesis an object, a unit, is produced. But this is not the origin of the idea of unity. On the contrary, the idea of unity must precede the synthesis, and indeed it makes the synthesis possible, for how can we perform an operation, when we have no idea of the result designed to be obtained? This idea of unity is therefore to be sought in a higher region, and is found in the original unity of apperception (p. 139 ff.), or self-consciousness, and that in the following manner: —

The idea: *I think,* must be able to accompany all my representations. If in any case this idea *cannot* accompany a representation, it is either because this is an *impossible* representation, or because it is *for me* nothing.

This idea is, however, an act of spontaneity. It is original because, although is must be able to accompany all others, it is itself accompanied by none. It precedes the first representation, and all representations are therefore referred to this one original unity, and in it they attain unity themselves. It is accordingly an a priori unity, going before all of them, and rendering them possible.

Now, the continual reference of different representations to one consciousness is only possible in that the subject, in proceeding from one of these representations to another, *adds* the one to the other. Thus through my ability to connect the manifold of given representations in one consciousness, am I conscious of the unity of this consciousness. Accordingly the idea that given representations *belong to me* means, *I unite them* in one self-consciousness.

This synthesis is therefore a priori, inasmuch as it is necessary to an a priori self-consciousness, or original unity of apperception. All this is equally true of a priori representations, viz. of objects in pure space, which we form before all experience. But if this manifold of pure intuition is to be united, it must be united according to some rules, that is by an act of the judgment. Since we are still in the realm of a priori intuition and synthesis, these rules must also likewise be a priori. Now the functions of judgment are the categories. They possess the marks of a priori forms, in that they are necessary and universal. They are therefore the a priori rules required, and accordingly an a priori synthesis is possible.

If now we follow the above argument in the reverse order, we see the force of it. The justification of the a priori character and use of the categories is their necessity if there is to be a priori synthesis. Such a synthesis is necessary, if there is to be a priori self-consciousness. And a priori self-consciousness is necessary, if there is to be any Knowledge whatever (cf. § 20 p. 146). The categories are therefore necessary to make knowledge or experience possible.

(c). Returning now to the process of actual synthesis which was broken off by the necessity of supposing an idea of unity before this synthesis could be performed, let us begin again with the first empirical perceptions and representations (p. 674ff). — The manifold of intuition and perception must be brought into a unity. The first step is *apprehension*. In order that two sensations should be united in apprehension, it is necessary that they should be *associated*. In order that they should be associated, it is necessary that they should be *compared* with one another, that is, that after the mind has passed away from the one and come to the other it should *reproduce* the first. And if the two are to be thus united, it is necessary that they should be united in some way, that is according to a rule, or that they should be *recognized* as being something in particular. Now, whence shall this rule be derived? It cannot be derived from the representations themselves, for then it would be of no fixed character, would not possess the characteristics of necessity and universality, and accordingly no *knowledge* would result from it. It must be a priori. The Empirical synthesis requires, therefore, to its completion a priori rules. Now the a priori synthesis has already provided these rules. Therefore the empirical synthesis rests upon the a priori synthesis. None of these processes are possible without self-consciousness, an empirical self-consciousness. But since some self-consciousness must accompany the first act, and is the presupposition of it, this self-consciousness must be a priori. Hence the empirical consciousness rests upon the a priori consciousness as its condition. And the latter rests upon the original synthetical unity of apprehension.

This is then the justification, or deduction of the categories. Their a priori character is first exhibited by their necessity and universality.

They are essential to experience (α) as being essential to the first condition of all experience, self-consciousness; and (β) as being essential to the formation of all empirical objects. They are thus the condition of experience, and make experience possible.

§ 4. The categories are thus shown to be applicable to objects of experience. Have they any other application? Kant answers no, and gives the following course of reasoning in support of his position. There are two elements requisite to every piece of knowledge. The first is the concept, or thought, which gives unity to it, etc. The second is intuition, without which our thoughts would remain only subjective, and we should not know whether they were realized in fact or not. Now the categories are these concepts, but they give us no knowledge until they are applied to an intuition, that is, in order to obtain knowledge through them, it is necessary that there should be experience. There may be *formal* knowledge without experience, as when, by the principles of mathematics we determine the forms which objects must assume, *if there are* such objects. Still this is a knowledge without contents, and is denied the name of knowledge by *Kant*. "The categories are, accordingly, of no use in attaining knowledge of things except so far as these are objects of a possible experience" (p. 149).

Now it might seem that knowledge thus limited to objects of a possible experience must be for this reason derived from such experience. But Kant says not (p. 162f.). There are only two possible ways in which a complete harmony between objects and our concepts can be obtained: either the concepts must be determined by the objects, or the objects by the concepts. The former way is impossible because these concepts are a priori, and thus independent of all experience. Accordingly only the latter way is possible, and it is possible because we have here to do not with things in themselves, but only with our representations, which being entirely in the mind may of course be governed by the laws of that mind. Thus we impose laws upon Nature.

Some have, however, suggested a middle way, viz. that the concepts are not a priori principles of the mind, independently produced by its own activity, nor are they derived from experience, but they are a disposition (Anlagen) to certain ways of thinking implanted in us by our Creator, in such a way that their use corresponds exactly to the course of experience as governed by the laws of nature. This would be a kind of preëstablished harmony, to use Leibnitz's term. Kant makes against this two objections: (1) it would be impossible to set limits to the assumption of such "dispositions", but, the principle once admitted, all kinds of opinions might be referred to this original provision of nature; and (2) the categories would not have the characteristic of necessity which they possess, and I should be able only to say: I am so constructed that I am compelled to *believe* that the effect is necessarily connected with the cause in the object, but not: It *is so*. But this is all that the Skeptic requires. He would then deny the objective validity of our judgments, and many would refuse to admit their subjective necessity.

§ 5. We have thus reached *Kant's* doctrine as to the transcendental use of the principle of causality, in its earliest stage. One of the categories is that of the relation of causality and dependence. If the categories in general cannot be applied except within the sphere of possible experience this category cannot be. That we may proceed in our study from this point with surer footsteps, it will be well to pause here and subject the results already reached to criticism.

(1.) *Kant's* reliance as a sign in the discovery of the a priori principles, and to some extent as a proof of their a priori character, is that they possess the character of necessity and universality. His simple statement already quoted. that experience can never give to the judgments derived from it strong necessity or universality, is disputed, for example, by the English associational school of philosophers, of whom the most prominent is John Stuart Mill. The principle of "inseparable association" plays an important part in their philosophy. They say that by long association two concepts may become so associated that no force of the mind is sufficient to separate them. They say still further that even if a concept possesses the character of necessity to me, it does not follow that it is of universal validity. For example they go so far as to say that it is possible there are worlds in the universe where the law of cause and effect does not hold, but where events succeed each other without any observable regularity; that it is possible there are worlds where two parallel lines, if prolonged far enough will meet &c. &c. At this point indeed *Kant* must agree with them. For, if cause and effect and the forms of intuition are contributed entirely by my mind, their existence depends upon the organization of my mind. And, if there are minds differently organized, — a possibility which *Kant* cannot and would not deny, — why may not their a priori laws, that is, their concepts, and their intuitions be entirely different from, or indeed contradictory of mine? — Here then is a view seriously urged by men of acumen and mental strength and not entirely inconsistent with the views of *Kant* himself. In the face of their arguments metaphysical science cannot be content with the simple declaration of *Kant* that experience can never give the character of necessity and universality to judgments. We must either have a psychological investigation into the origin of our necessary ideas (cf. *James Mill,* "Analysis"), or this must be shown by suitable argument to be unnecessary (cf. *Lotze*). We need a *proof*, — which *Kant* does not give.

(2.) *Kant's* doctrine that the categories are necessary to constitute experience, he has however established. We do not mean to say that all the so called categories are established, for the table of categories seems to have been made up in a somewhat too mechanical manner, and the asserted logical completeness of it confers upon it no true scientific character. Some categories which are presented as distinct, seem to be identical, as for example, reality and existence. Whether we bring to the manifold of intuition the category of substance or not, may be a question. But the idea of the synthesis as a spontaneous operation of the mind, necessary to the perception of an object, and the concept of causality as a law preceding all such synthesis and necessary to make it possible, seems to us to be fully made out. Whether *Kant* does not lose some of the advantage he thus gains subsequently by incomplete presentation of the doctrine of causality, we shall have occasion to examine later (cf. § 7 below). But that the principle of causality is *brought to* the consideration of every event, and that events are interpreted *in accordance with* it, seems to us clearly proved. For the materials with which we work in these mental operations are our representations, and certainly we do not *see* or *feel* any causal connection between them, but simply behold their succession. If it is said by the English associational school that the repeated occurrence of a consequent in invariable connection with an antecedent suggests the idea of causality, we may answer, with *Lotze,* that the mystery is to explain how the idea of causality *first arises*, if we do not bring it to the objects (Log. p. 522). This seems to be a full reply to them, but it is not an advance upon *Kant*, whose thought is the very same. *Kant* says (R. V. p. 213). The case with causality "is the same as with other pure ideas a priori, which we can draw from experience as clear ideas *only for the reason that* we have put them into that experience, and thereby brought it first into existence". That is to say that if a causal connection in phenomena is presented to us, we need an a priori principle in order to perceive it.

(3.) *Kant's* proof of the non-applicability of causality except to objects of possible experience, is however a complete failure. It is precisely the same argument as that given in respect to space and time, and like that consists in a leap from one statement to another which is much more comprehensive. He says that the categories give knowledge *until* there is added to them an intuition, and then he declares that they cannot be applied except to objects of a possible experience, that is *any further than* an intuition. Evidently the most that he is justified in saying is that *we do not know* that they can be applied except to objects of a possible experience.

And yet, if he is to insist upon the definition of the word knowledge which he gives, it is impossible not to admit his statements. He defines knowledge as requiring two elements, — the concept by which the object is *thought*, and the intuition by which it is *given*. It is thus possible to use the word knowledge exclusively of those things which we perceive, or become sensible of. In this sense we cannot *know* anything about the *Ding an sich* which can never be given, nor about God.[1] Every philosophy must admit that we cannot know these *as* we do the objects of our inner world. We may claim to know all there is to be known about the objects of our experience, but in respect to the *Ding an sich* we must, according to *any* philosophy be content to know its existence and that it possesses qualities whereby it is qualified to give rise to our perceptions and sensations. Our knowledge of God will be similar. Now it is possible to call the latter *faith*[1] in distinction from *knowledge.* But the question is: Have we *intellectual* grounds for this faith? Can we employ the principle of causality in such a way as to gain thereby substantial proof of this faith? Or, does it come entirely another way, as for example in *Kant's* way of a supposition necessary in order to have a principle of procedure in our investigations of nature, and for which the absence of all rebutting arguments furnishes a certain support, or in the way of a postulate for moral ideas? *Kant* in denying this oversteps his bounds, and so far as the use of words is concerned, he denies of faith what he is only justified in denying of knowledge, and thus limits it more than he is justified in doing.

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[1] For a definition of "*Erkennen*" see R. V. p. 148 f. cf. pp. 46, 209, 291; especially the contemptuous rejection of "probability in metaphysics", Prolg. p. 134.

(4). It is very striking that *Kant,* who was so fully convinced of the correctness of his own solution of the problems of experience through a priori concepts applicable only to experience, should have suggested the "middle way" which he does, to explain the harmony of our concepts with the course of nature. And it is still more remarkable that having suggested it, he was content with so poor a refutation of it. He speaks of a certain *disposition* to particular ways of thinking, or a *subjective* necessity of thought, and then says that if this were the case, our a priori ideas would lose all their *objective* necessity. This is merely a repetition of the argument for the transcendental ideality of space and time, and commission of the same fallacy. It may be a *question* whether a subjectively necessary idea is also objectively necessary, and this question may need a careful investigation. But *Kant* negatives the question without the investigation. He thus takes sides, as he confesses, with the skeptics, for he believes that his own theory is the only answer to them. Whether it is so or not, and whether the skeptics do not fall into great difficulties as soon as they raise doubts as to any necessity of thought, we shall see in the sequel, (§ 30).

§ 6. *Kant* has now sketched the process by which the mind forms experience out of the rough materials given it in the sensations, in a general way. It proceeds by the employment of judgments which are connected with, or spring out of the categories, and he now sets about presenting these judgments in systematic form. With this development we have no immediate concern as a whole, since it involves no new principles. It is preceded by a remarkable section devoted to what is called "Schematism", the object of which is to find a means of applying abstract concepts to objects of the sensibility. This does not concern us especially, except to note in passing, that *Kant,* entirely unnecessarily,

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1) *Glaube.* cf. espec. p. 636 ff. *"die Lehre vom Dasein Gottes gehört zum doktrinalen Glauben".*

introduces here the idea of time, which we shall find later to be of disadvantage to him in developing the idea of causality. We shall therefore only note the proofs given of the analogies of experience in general, and of causality in particular, with a view of finding out more clearly just what *Kant* means by this concept of causality.

The principle common to all the analogies of experience is thus formulated by *Kant* (p. 197): "Experience is only possible through the idea of a necessary connection of perceptions." The proof in condensed form is as follows: Experience is knowledge. But knowledge implies synthesis, for our perceptions without synthesis are a disordered mass, incapable of affording knowledge. Perceptions contain no element of necessity, but fall into merely chance combinations (*"kommen nur zufälliger Weise zu einander"*). But knowledge, and consequently the existence of objects of knowledge, demands that the synthesis be determinate and fixed, that is necessary. Space and time contribute nothing to this necessity, and it must therefore be contributed by the only element that remains, viz. the understanding, that is, through a priori concepts which combine the perceptions in a necessary manner.

We may pause here to ask whether it is true, or at least, whether *Kant* has advanced any argument to support his statement that our perceptions fall into merely chance combinations. It is true that perceptions considered as such are indifferent to one another, and it makes no difference, so far as *they* are concerned if we combine such sets of perceptions as the flowing river, a moving ship, and a walking horse, so that the horse shall walk upon the river, and bear the ship upon his back, instead of the ship's sailing upon the river, and the horse's walking upon its deck. In imagination we make such combinations. Why never in reality? Is not this the reason, even from the Kantian standpoint, that the perceptions of actual life are determined by the *Dinge an sich*, and does not this mean that the perceptions are inseparably combined in themselves, and determined by their origin, and that they do not first wait for us to bring our concepts to them? (cf. §§. 17. 18 below).

The second analogy is stated by *Kant* in these words (p. 207): "All changes take place according to the law of the combination of cause and effect." Or, as the first edition ran: "All that takes place presupposes something else whereupon it follows according to a rule." The proof is: I perceive a circumstance at one moment, the opposite of which was at the previous moment. That is, I connect two perceptions in time. This connection is the work of synthesis, which could, however, connect the two circumstances in two different ways. Time itself cannot be perceived, so that it could be empirically determined from this what precedes, and what follows in the object. Unless there is some other law governing the synthesis, if one perception appears to me before the other I am only conscious that my imagination puts the one first, and the other second, not that this order lies in the objects themselves. But this relation must be fixed *in the object*, if I am to have knowledge. This can be done only by a concept, because it is by the concepts that objects are first formed out of the materials given to the mind in the sensations, and this must be an a priori concept of the understanding, which is here the relation of cause and effect, of which the cause fixes the effect as its consequence. Without this a priori, and therefore necessary connection, there could be no experience and no knowledge.

Herbart (I, 198. cf. I, 128) blames *Kant* for introducing time into his treatment of causality, which, as *Herbart* justly remarks, has nothing to do with it. We will not urge in *Kant's* defence that he is compelled to do so by his "Schematism", but will call attention to the fact that he subsequently (p. 218) modifies the idea of time in such a way as to eliminate it really from this discussion. He acknowledges that cause and effect can be simultaneous in their occurrence, and then adds: "One must note here that we are considering *order in time,* and not the *lapse* of the same; the relation remains when no time has elapsed." That is to say, the order of cause and effect is *logical,* rather than *chronological.* In any particular case the latter order may not be perceived, but the former always holds true. Thus the element of time has only a *formal* place in *Kant's* theory, and is quite unnecessary, like so many other portions of his system.

§ 7. What now is this causality which *Kant* here establishes? It is, in the words of his "principle", the succession of events upon one another "according to a rule". It is simply the reign of law in the phenomena of nature. One circumstance forms the *condition* upon which the *consequent* must follow. When once through observation the empirical laws of causality have been learned, the a priori law of causality enables us in every case to reason from the condition to the consequent, and from the consequent to the condition. There is no essential difference between this doctrine and that of John Stuart Mill and the other representatives of the English associational school, except that *Kant* establishes a *necessary* connection between the condition and consequent, and Mill contents himself with saying that it is *invariably* valid (p. 216).

The idea of *power,* and of *efficient* causation, or of the operation of a will, as an intelligent cause having in view definite purposes, is completely unprovided for by this theory. It is true that *Kant* speaks of action, power, and substance in this connection (p. 219), but he does not develop these ideas, nor could he except in the line of a blind force of nature. The only proper introduction of intelligence into such a plan would be that of an original intelligence from which all things proceeded, and by which they were determined from the very first. But this is an impossible supposition to *Kant,* because, if we mount the series of cause and effect, we can never come to a cause that is not also an effect, so that the idea of an intelligent first cause is impossible. This we shall however discuss more fully below (cf. § 38 below). Meantime that *Kant* *proves* this reign of law so as to shut out the operation of freedom within the plenomenal world, may be doubted.

The peculiar operation of causality is shown by *Kant's* theory of change (p. 220). This is viewed as the passage of an object out of one condition into another. This requires a lapse of time (longer or shorter) and *Kant* speaks of an intervening condition of the object. The causal element operates during the whole period, and accordingly, the causation has continuous operation. Here again the element of power is eliminated, and causality becomes reduced to occasionalism or perhaps to a process of development.

It is not necessary to consider at length the proof for mutual causation (p. 239 ff.), which is the third analogy. It contains no new elements. One thing should be remarked, that through this analogy, which is merely a modification of the principle of causality, the possibility of a series of a priori laws of nature is given, which *Kant* proceeds to develop, thus making an important contribution to the logic of natural science.

§ 8. We have traversed with *Kant,* so far as our theme requires, the whole region of the operations of the mind within itself, and have come to the end of the application of causality to the phenomena of the inner world. In stepping forth now into the transcendental sphere, we meet first the famous *Ding an sich.* We must tarry for a time upon the consideration of this theme. It is scarcely necessary to quote passages to prove that *Kant* accepted the existence of the *Dinge an sich,* but we may proceed at once to discuss his development of his doctrine.

I. The mere existence of the *Dinge an sich.* For this *Kant* advances certain proofs in his Pure Reason.

(a). The existence of the *Ding an sich* is proved from the mere word applied to the phenomena of the inner world, namely *phenomena.* This as denoting an appearance necessarily implies something which appears, and shows that the mind has already the conception of something which is independent of sensuous perceptions, and an object in itself (R. V. p. 260. Prol. p. 70.

(b). The proof is given at greater length in the "refutation of idealism" (R. V. p. 235.). As this is an extremely difficult passage, it will be well to consider it more at length.

(1). It is important to an understanding of this passage to note what *Kant* had in mind when he wrote it. From the preliminary remark (p. 235.), we gather that he is opposing the ideas both of Descartes and of Berkeley. What these ideas are, he states in an ambiguons manner, speaking of "things in space" (*"Dinge im Raum"*) in such a way that we do not know whether he refers to the "objects", viz. our perceptions as clothed with the form of space, through the operation of our mental powers, or the *"Dinge an sich".* The Prolegomena helps us somewhat here. I quote the passage[1]. "The essence of idealism consists in the affirmation that there are *none other than thinking beings*. Other things, which we think we perceive through the intuitions would be only ideas in thinking beings, to which no object existing exterior to these would correspond in fact. I say *on the contrary:* Things are given to us as *objects existing exterior to ourselves*". Now here it seems to be as plain as it can be, that *Kant* represents the idealism *which he opposes* as teaching the existence of "*objects*" and *only* "objects", and that he, *on the contrary*, teaches the existence of "things without us", which are not merely objects, but more than they, that is are "*Dinge an sich*". Now, if he opposes idealism in this way in *this* passage, (written *after* the appearance of the criticisms which were made upon the Pure Reason at its first publication), he opposes it in the same way in the passage of the Pure Reason before us[1]. What he is seeking to prove is therefore the existence of the *Ding an sich.*

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[1] Prol. p. 39 ff. *"Der Idealismus besteht in der Behauptung dass es keine anderen als denkende Wesen gebe; die übrigen Dinge, die wir in der Anschauung wahrzunehmen glauben, wären nur Vorstellungen in den denkenden Wesen, denen in der That kein ausserhalb dieser befindlicher Gegenstand*

(2). This view finds some support in the text of the passage before us. Berkeley is said to declare the "things in space" (*Dinge im Raum*) to be merely imaginary. This, says *Kant*, is unavoidable, when one regards space as a *property* belonging to the "things in themselves" (*Dinge an sich*). It is most natural to take the word "thing" in both these cases in the same sense, viz. that which is fixed by the second. It is possible that *Kant* here quotes Berkeley's phrase when he says "things in space". As is well known Berkeley did not deny the reality of our *thoughts* only that there was a real world corresponding to them. This, and not the world of thought was what he called imaginary. *Kant* must be understood to refute Berkeley as he meant, at any rate in so elementary a thing as this.

(3). Such objections as that *Kant* becomes by our interpretation inconsistent with himself[2] we hope to remove, at least partly, in the sequel (see II below). The explanations which are given of *Kant's* terms, showing that in this passage he does not refer to the *Ding an sich*, must indeed be allowed to have force. If it is said, for example, that by "*äussere Gegenstände*" *Kant* never meant *Dinge an sich*, this is true in so far as this, that such is *Kant's* terminology to which he *should* always adhere. But it is notorious that he uses terms very loosely, even confounding repeatedly such terms of polar opposition as transcendental, and transcendent.

But the context presents reasons for rejecting such explanations here. Take for example the phrase: "*nicht durch die blosse Vorstellung eines Dinges ausser mir*". Suppose *Ding ausser mir* to mean an *Object* in the technical Kantian sense of that word. Now have we

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korrespondirte. Ich dagegen sage: es sind uns Dinge als ausser uns befindliche Gegenstände unserer Sinne gegeben".

[1] Prol. 141 ff. This passage states the opposition between him and Berkeley very sharply.

[2] *E. g. Fischer, Gesch. II. 397.* "*Kant gab die eigene Lehre auf eine unbegreifliche Weise Preis*". *Fischer* accepts our interpretation of the passage.

Vorstellungen of such objects? The objects themselves *are* the *Vorstellungen* which *Kant* means. It is evident then that if idea means object, *Ding ausser mir* must mean *Ding an sich.* Or if it be said that *Vorstellung* here means imagination, and not representation, then we say that if *Vorstellung* means imagination this imagination is as good for *Kant's* purposes as the *Ding* understood as "object", for if the imagination be only permanent, it can perform the office required. Indeed our sensations are in the last resort only modifications of the soul, and can perform no office for consciousness which the representations cannot equally well perform. But if this explanation should be regarded as unsatisfactory, see the clause: *"dass die einzige unmittelbare Erfahrung die innere sei, und daraus auf äussere Dinge nur geschlossen werde".* Now, what experience can one put between the *"Objecte"* if *äussere Dinge* means that, and *"die unmittelbare Erfahrung"?* The latter *are* the objects, and no one could imagine there could be any "concluding" from one to the other. So again in the same sentence.

The same concession must also be made in reference to the phrase *"das Beharrliche in der Wahrnehmung"*, that it *should* mean the idea of substance. But *Kant*, as if to shut out this idea here, says in the second note: *"So"* (that is *"durch Beziehung auf das Beharrliche im Raume"*, that is, this idea of substance,) *"haben wir nichts Beharrliches . . . . als . . . . die Materie, und selbst diese Beharrlichkeit wird . . . . durch die Existenz äusserer Dinge vorausgesetzt."* That is, he is striving after something more truly a *"Beharrliches"* than the "substance", and finds this in the existence of *äusserer Dinge.*

Now, as all these expressions are easily explained upon the supposition that *Kant's* language had become popular instead of technical under the influence of Berkeley's writings, the objections founded upon them seem not to have decisive weight.

(4). Let us now analyze this argument and then discuss its relation to our subject. The following are the steps:

α. I am conscious of my existence as defined in time.

β. All definition in time presupposes something permanent in our perceptions.

γ. This permanent something cannot be something *in me,* because my existence in time can only be defined by this permanent something.

We must interpret this phrase *"in me"* according to the context. Now, in the negative part of the following sentence *Kant* repeats the thought. This negative part, accordingly, affords the clue to the phrase before us, and we must substitute the following formula for it to arrive at the meaning. In me = the simple representation. Now, a simple representation is either conveyed to me from without, or is the product of my own activity. The former presupposes the *Ding an sich,* the latter is impossible because I cannot be active until I am conscious, and this representation is the supposed *condition* of my consciousness. To put it in other words: The representation is the result either of receptivity, or of spontaneity. It cannot be the latter, and the next proposition goes on to say: It must therefore be the former.

Now, of course, this is not conclusive against Berkeley, because he supposes that that which operates upon our receptivity is God, and not the *Ding an sich*. *Fischer* is accordingly right in saying in the passage cited above, that as a refutation of Berkeley the passage is not successful.

δ. This something permanent in my perceptions is therefore only possible through a thing without me, and not through the mere idea of a thing without me.

ε. Consequently the definition of my existence in time is only possible through the existence of real things which I perceive without me.

ζ. Now, consciousness in time is necessarily connected with consciousness of the possibility of this definition in time. Consequently it is also necessarily connected with the existence of things without me as the condition of definition in time, that is, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me.

The result of this argument is to prove that we have an immediate consciousness of the existence of the external world. We do not know what *Kant* meant by immediate consciousness, and he seems himself not to have had perfectly clear ideas upon this point, for he says in the footnote (p. 237): "The immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is not *presupposed* in the foregoing argument, but *proved, whether we perceive the possibility of this consciousness or not!*"[1] He contrasts it with mere "concluding" as to the existence of external things, and yet, if we have correctly interpreted the division γ above, that is an argument from causality to the existence of the *Ding an sich*. More simply stated it would be: My consciousness is indissolubly connected with time. I cannot pass from unconsciousness to consciousness by a voluntary act, for an unconscious volition is a self-contradiction. Accordingly I am brought into consciousness by the operation upon me of some other being. That is, my consciousness is the proof of the existence of some other thing and in my consciousness I am conscious of this other thing which affects me, and calls forth consciousness.[2] Now, this is certainly an argument to the existence of external things from the principle of causality. As a proof that we

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1) Is it possible that *Kant* had been reading Reid's "Inquiry" which came out in 1763? (trans. into German 1782) or Reid's Essay on the Intellectual Faculties of man, 1785? It is the chief doctrine of the Scottish school that we have an "immediate knowledge" of the external world. Consciousness, they say, implies two elements, a subject, and an object. The subject is the Ego, and the object must be the external world. In every act of consciousness there is, therefore, immediately given a knowledge of the external world.

2) It may be with reference to such passages that *Herbart* said (I, 292.): *"Kant dachte mit einer ihm selbst verborgenen Nothwendigkeit den Erscheinungen Dinge an sich hinzu"*.

have understood *Kant* correctly, in thus interpreting his argument, we note under the next head

(c.) That *Kant* specially calls this *Ding an sich* the *cause* of our representations. The most striking passage is (p. 410, cf. 287): "The *nonsensuous cause* of these representations is wholly unknown to us, and we cannot therefore have intuition of it as object .... But we may name the merely intelligible cause of phenomena in general the *transcendental object*, for the mere purpose of having something which corresponds to the sensuousness as receptivity. We may ascribe to this transcendental object all the range and connection of our possible perceptions, and say that it is *in itself given before* experience." It will be noticed that this passage confirms our view of *Kant's* argument, not only by its use of the word cause, but also by its demand for something which shall "correspond with the sensuousness as receptivity". This is the argument we presented under γ above. — *Kant* says also (Prol. p. 74): "Nature, in its material signification, is made possible" in consequence of the form of our sensuousness, according to which it is affected in a way peculiar to it by objects which are in themselves unknown to it, and entirely distinct from phenomena."

(d). *Kant* also presents the *Ding an sich* as a necessity of thought. Examples of this form of expression are: "Things which the understanding *must think* as *Dinge an sich*" (p. 262). "The concept of a noumenon taken simply problematically, remains nevertheless not only admissible, but as a concept which prescribes limits to the sensuous faculties, unavoidable" (p. 265). "A transcendental object *must* lie at the basis of phenomena, since these are not *Dinge an sich*" (p. 439). — Of course, this is not *that* necessity which *Lotze*, for example, ascribes to the causal principle itself.

(e). It is also represented as a "supposition".[1] — We pass now to

II. The *Ding an sich* as an object of knowledge.

Kant says repeatedly that the categories have no application to this *Ding an sich*. These make experience possible in that they take the unformed material of our perceptions and sensations and reduce them to order and fit them for knowledge. Beyond experience they are not applicable, and so, as the *Ding an sich* lies without experience, as a transcendental object, itself not a representation, accordingly not subject to the process of formation through which the latter pass under the operation of the categories, it cannot become subject to them (cf. pp. 251, 265, 285). But what is the meaning of this restriction? ~~A few~~ passages will make it clear. For example *Kant* says (p. 257): "The principles of the understanding" are simply principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an Ontology, which professes to give in a systematic form a synthetical knowledge a priori of things in general (for example, the principle of causality) must make

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1) *Annahme, p. 258, Note* (from first edition.) cf. P. V. pp. 51, 57, 58, 67, 68, 160, 161, 162, 164.

way for the modest appearance of the simple Analytic of the Pure Reason." This is as much as to say: The categories *expound* phenomena, but they do *not* expound the *Ding an sich.* They give a *synthetical* and *systematic* doctrine of phenomena, but not of the *Ding an sich.* In other words, they cannot be applied to the *Ding an sich* so as to give it a *distinct* existence. The *Ding an sich* is like the sensation before it has been subjected to the operation of the categories. If we seek to apply, for example, the category of existence and non-existence to it, it *exists,* but it does not exists under the categories, that is for the *"Erkenntniss"*. It has not a *regulated* existence, so that it can be the object of *knowledge.* Such an existence the *Ding an sich* does not have, and furthermore, such a non-existence it does not have, that is, one such that the times and occasions of its non-existence can be definitely known and described. Or, applying the principle of causality, as *Kant* suggests to us to do, we cannot connect the *Dinge an sich* within their own transcendent sphere, in a chain of cause and effect which shall reduce them to the condition of ordered knowledge, so that from one member of the series we can proceed to another member. Causality in a certain sense can be applied to it, in as much as it is the cause of phenomena (p. 287), but not that causality which the category teaches, viz. the physical succession of cause and effect[1]. Substance is for example not to be predicated of it. If we understand *Kant* correctly, his meaning may be illustrated roughly by a comparison between physical and spiritual substances. Suppose for argument's sake, the category of substance to be entirely exhausted by the idea of physical substance. *Kant* would say, the category cannot be applied to the *Dinge an sich.* That is, we cannot say that they exist after *this* fashion. They may exist after *another* fashion, and here our idea of spiritual substance, which I have supposed for illustration's sake to be excluded from the category, comes in as giving a glimpse of what such a declaration could mean. The *Dinge an sich* might all be spirits. — Hence, in a word, we also do not know the *interior* of things (pp. 279, 286).

III. The place of the *Dinge an sich* in *Kant's* system is accordingly that of a limiting concept. It sets bounds to the realm within which the sensuousness is confined, und within which through the categories, definite knowledge is possible. It designates the great unknown beyond (pp. 264, 287.), and lies before the mind of the philosopher like the great sea, stretching beyond the limits of sight into the immeasurable and unseen. In this respect it is the great problem of the reason *whether* there is such a great, immeasurable unknown, and, if so, *what* it is, — a problem which the understanding can never solve (p. 286.).

§ 9. Before we proceed further we have to note that *Kant* has thus taught by example and declared to be unavoidable and necessary to the mind, *a* Transcendent use of the principle of causality. He has been compelled to assume *Dinge an sich* as the cause of those perceptions &c. upon which the mind operates to produce experience. The *Ding an sich* is as necessary to experience as the categories themselves. This is not *that* causality which is presented in the category, the necessary connection of antecedent and consequent in the physical series, an inexplicable fate in nature, but rather an *efficient* causality, and an exercise of power.

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[1] cf. particularly p. 439, where efficient causality is ascribed to the soul as a *Ding an sich.*

This concession made to the necessities of the case demands further concessions which *Kant* has not made, and here is exhibited a defect in his system. He really falls into the same scepticism which he urges against the idea of a system of preformation above. If the *Dinge an sich* produce representations in us, they must produce them according to the interior modification of their own natures, there must be a fixed relation between the thing and its representation, and unless the body of representations is finally to assume a form which shall defy all the harmonizing power of the categories, there must exist between the external things a relation which shall secure the combination of intuition with appropriate sensations and perceptions, and not leave us to a mere chaotic mass of sounds or sensations, for example, without intuitable forms &c. &c. If causality defines succession in time, those invariable antecedents and consequents which form the laws of nature, must be given in such a combination that they can be formed under the law of causality, that is, there must be in the things themselves some relation to time. Thus there are reasons for assuming *something corresponding to the system of categories* in the ontological world, and the only possible reason *Kant* can bring against the extension of the principle of causality, when he has once consented to use it in proof of the existence of *Dinge an sich*, is the old sceptical cry, "*perhaps* after all everything may be in reality entirely different from what it seems to be", perhaps our laws of thought do not apply to the external world, however much they may seem to apply. This, as *Lotze* says (*Logik* p. 475, § 303.) is merely the groundless "perhaps" which can indeed *never* be refuted, because after the most rigorous proof, it will come up again, having still as much reason for its objection as it had at first, for that was none at all; but which *deserves* no refutation.

§ **10.** One part of the realm of the *Ding an sich* demands our closer attention, — the Soul (p. 153 ff.). This is in one respect a phenomenon, for it develops itself under the form of a series of representations and operations, all of which stand immediately under its self-consciousness. The categories can be applied to the soul considered as a phenomenon as well as to the objects presented to the soul. And the result in the former case is knowledge which is comparable in all respects with that knowledge which is gained in the latter. But just as knowledge is confined in the latter case to the *representations,* and does not extend to the *Dinge an sich* which lie behind them, so it stops short at the series of modifications of the soul, and does not extend to a soul beyond these. It reaches to the phenomena, but not to the *Ding an sich.* Accordingly we know ourselves *not as we are,* but as we *appear* to ourselves. That is, the soul so far as we know it, is a mere series of representations. This agrees with the doctrine of John Stuart Mill.

But is there anything which *is,* a subject, a *Ding an sich,* behind this phenomenon, as there is behind our representations? *Kant* replies: Yes. He might have reasoned from the series of representations, according to the law of causality to a *Ding an sich* behind them. For if a representation involves a spontaneous external thing, because it is the phenomenon of a merely receptive something, then this receptivity itself requires a subject which shall be receptive. Or, more simply, if the representation does not lie wholly in the *Ding an sich,* if there is a coöperation required to produce it, this coöperation presupposes a subject as well as an object. In fact, a series of representations independent of any subject is an unthinkable thing. It may as well be independent of the *Ding an sich,* which according to *Kant* is also impossible. Yet I do not find any sure evidences that *Kant* adopts this argument. He seems to prefer one which he ostensibly adopts in his refutation of idealism for the *Ding an sich.* We are *immediately conscious* of our existence as *Ding an sich.* I know *that* I am. This is involved in the a priori proposition, I think. True we gain no knowledge *about* ourselves, but we gain an immediate knowledge of our mere existence (p. 156).

Yet here again the impossibility of avoiding the direct argument from causality, which we observed in the refutation of idealism becomes evident. In the footnote to page 156 *Kant* says: "The: I think, expresses the act of defining my existence. The existence is therefore already given". Now, if this means that I set to work to define my existence, and therefore because I attempt to *define* it, it is necessary that I have already an *idea* of this existence, the argument, on *Kant's* own principles, amounts to nothing. One can have an idea of a hundred thalers, and set out to define that idea, without advancing in the least towards the reality of those hundred thalers. But if he means that thinking is an act which defines my existence, that is, is activity, operation, and demands an active agent, an operator, in short a cause, the argument has force. We interpret it therefore in this way and understand it as an application of the principle of causality to prove that which *Kant* declares to be given to us immediately.

Kant is consistent with his doctrine as to the *Ding an sich* in general in denying all knowledge of the soul apart from its mere existence. Yet in this he is as little justified as in the former case, and for the same reasons. If the soul as a *Ding an sich* receives impressions from other *Dinge,* it must be fitted by its nature to receive those impressions. Furthermore this receptivity of the soul must be a regulated and orderly receptivity, so that the same *Ding* will always produce the same impressions, or else order in our representations, and all knowledge, to which this order is indispensable is impossible. If there are different kinds of *Dinge an sich* and different kinds of operation from them, there must be an interior modification of this receptive subject, or else different representations will be impossible. And furthermore, if in general the soul is to be affected by other *Dinge*, it must stand in mutual relations with them. So that we are compelled either to know *more* about the soul than *Kant* admits, or we cannot know *so much*. If it exists at all it must be more richly endowed by our positive knowledge than he permits.

§ **11.** Our subject now naturally carries us over into the region of the Transcendental Dialectic. It would be interesting to linger over each separate part of this remarkable division of the Pure Reason, and confirm our previous criticisms by new observations. Strength is added to an argument by mere accumulation of evidence. But the result would be otherwise comparatively small, and the great amount of space which our considerations have already demanded, warns us to hasten them as much as possible. With one passing remark, we shall proceed immediately to the third antinomy. It is suggested by the table upon page 336, but is little more than a repetition of remarks made in the previous section. If the propositions presented in this table, viz. "I think as subject, as a simple subject, as an identical subject, in every case of thought", be endowed with *any* meaning whatever, they lead by an unavoidable use of the principle of causality to some positive knowledge about the soul. If they are left without meaning, the whole idea of the Ego is vain and empty, even self-contradictory, and it were better to leave the whole subject untouched than to abandon it at this point.

The *third* antinomy bears more directly upon our subject. We shall not follow its argument, both sides of which are according to *Kant* of equal evidence. *Kant* however suggests, as his resolution of the difficulty[1], a possible addition to the idea of causality in proposing a causality through freedom, and with this we have to do. What is his doctrine, and what is its value?

In the phenomenal world which is controlled by the categories, there can be no freedom, for every event is entirely determined by antecedent events, and must follow in accordance with the conditions imposed by them. But there is no reason to deny that in the intelligible world of things, since the categories have no control there, an event may occur without reference to any combination of previous conditions, and that thus, particularly in the human soul, viewed as a *Ding an sich*, there may be a perfect autonomy of action, or freedom (p. 435 ff.). The soul enters into the world of phenomena through its actions, and these must therefore become subject to all the laws of phenomena, and among others, to that of causality. Every human action is accordingly fully determined in its effects from their phenomenal side, though, considered as pertaining to the intelligible world, it may be at the same time perfectly free.

We have thus apparently arrived at an efficient causality. There is, first, the causality of the course of nature, governed by the categories. There is, second, the causality operating from the Transcendent world producing representations, which may, or may not, be the direct operation of will. We have now the third, autonomous action of a free will producing effects in the world of sense, that is, apparently a genuine efficient cause. Let us examine it.

Kant says himself that the idea of a transcendental freedom is "exceedingly obscure" (p. 438), but we think that it will be found upon examination to be unthinkable. It is exceedingly difficult to see how we could *first come* to such an idea upon *Kant's* theory. His own expressions are various. Sometimes he calls it a creation of the reason in its efforts to gain an absolute totality of conditions (p. 436 *"die Vernunft schafft sich die Idee"*). Again he derives it from the practical reason, as a necessary postulate for responsibility (p. 445.). In another place he seems to teach that it arises from consciousness (p. 448, *"Bisweilen finden wir etc."*), in another he says it is founded upon a "law of the mind" [1].

Now, if freedom is a matter of consciousness, then consciousness tells us not only *that* we are, but *what* we are, at least in one respect, and thus gives a knowledge of the *Ding an sich*, which is an entire contradiction of *Kant's* system. But if *Kant* did not intend to teach this doctrine, then the whole idea of the causality through freedom is an impossible idea. For, upon his theory, the idea of such freedom could never originate in our minds, even if we were free. For our knowledge is divided into two parts, the first, knowledge *that* I am, by an immediate consciousness, the second, the knowledge of myself as a series of phenomena. From the first of these two divisions of knowledge there comes evidently no idea of freedom. Equally evident is it that such an idea could not originate from the second. As phenomenon, I stand under all the laws of phenomena, that is, under the categories. All knowledge of myself is derived by applying the categories, and consequently I can know myself *only* as my representations fall under the law of causality, that is, *only* as they are connected with one another by an exclusive law of necessity. Thus all the phenomena of my mind are necessitated, and how can I think of anything free in this connection? Such an idea might arise as we speak of parallel lines which cross each other, — a mere arbitrary combination of contradictory terms, — but such is not *Kant's* meaning. Such an idea is accompanied with the consciousness that it is a mere imagination, and an *impossible* thought, while the idea of *Kant* is a *necessary* thought, a postulate of the practical reason, a consciousness. Such an existence as it has according to *Kant*, it could never gain in consistency with his theories.

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[1] cf. p. 621, *Wir erkennen also die praktische Freiheit durch Erfahrung.*

But through inconsistency of reasoning, and the unwillingness of the mind to be bound by false theories, the idea of such a freedom has suggested itself to *Kant*. Yet the closer it is examined, the more it seems to be unthinkable. *Kant* falls into contradictory forms of speech, as when he says (p. 449.): "If the reason can have causality in reference to phenomena, then it is a power *through which* the sensous *condition* of an empirical series of effects *first begins*." But the "sensuous condition" is itself the effect of a preceding *physical* cause, and "begins" through this of necessity. If this is not an immediate self-contradiction, then it must be explained in a way in which alone the whole idea of a transcendent freedom working in a chain of necessitated cause and effect is possible, viz. that the *Ding an sich* and a previous phenomenon are, at the same time, the determining cause of the same phenomenon. This results in a dilemma. To make it plain, we will draw the figure below. Let the side *B* of the line *C* represent the phenomenal world, and the side *A* the intelligible world. 2, a reason endowed with freedom is the cause of a change in the object 1 in the phenomenal world, which is itself connected according to the law of cause and effect with other objects in this world, 3, 4, 5 &c. The given change in 1 is fully determined by 3 as well as by 2. This is possible only under two suppositions. (1) Either 2 determines 3, (2) or 3 determines 2. (1) If 2 determines 3 because it determines 1, then it must determine 4 because it determines 3, 5 because it determines 4, &c. till the whole course of nature is determined by 2, that is, nature is destroyed. Or (2) if 3 determines 2, then the freedom of 2 is destroyed. — It will be noted that this dilemma is independent of all considerations of time. It applies equally well, therefore, to the intelligible and the phenomenal world.



The connection between the two worlds through the idea of "causality through freedom" is therefore unthinkable.

But more than that, the idea of causality in the intelligible world which *Kant* advances, is also unthinkable. It is repeated in several places that in the *Ding an sich*, considered as a free cause, no change takes place, and no action begins or ceases (p. 440, 441, 444, 448). *Kant* even drives such expressions to their extremest form by saying: One could affirm of the subject as noumenon "that it begins its effects in the world of sense of itself, without the action's beginning in it, and this would be true without the effect in the world of sense, therefore being able to begin of itself" (p. 441). *Kant* is of course driven to this position by maintaining the ideality of time, for change depends upon conditions of time. But such a cause is completely unthinkable. It is indeed a self-contradiction to say that in a cause during its causal operation, no action begins or ceases.

One may say for *Kant* that he does not attempt to establish the reality or the possibility of this transcendent free cause (p. 452). But though he does not claim to establish its possibility *in fact*, he does *in thought*, which he has however failed to do. And even allowing him to have attained it, it is for practical purposes entirely useless according to *Kant's* own confession, and so may be entitled in all respects strange to his system (p. 448).

Kant has, then, as yet failed to give us any doctrine as to efficient causation, but this attempt, though it has proved to be a failure even in giving us the idea of the possibility of a transcendental freedom, has shown how unavoidable the problem is, and has laid the problem fairly before *Kant's* successors.

§ 12. We come now to the last attempt to pass out over the limits of the world of experience which *Kant* considers. This is the attempt to prove the existence of a God. *Kant* mentions three different proofs, the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological, or teleological proofs. With the first of these we have nothing to do, as it does not profess to call the principle of causality into play. With the second also we have little or nothing to do, since, though it transcends the limits set by experience it yet seeks to do this the help of the laws of causality as they are developed in the system of nature, and accordingly will afford us no very new material for consideration, but merely repeat in the main, what we have already said while considering the *Ding an sich*, and the soul. With the combination which *Kant* makes of the ontological argument with the other proofs we will not concern ourselves. Sufficient to say that it is unnecessary. Still the cosmological argument is of a negative importance, since it shows the necessity of further investigation in this direction.[1] If there is a demand for a cause for our representations as *Kant* himself teaches, the entire series of representations considered as a whole, and bearing marks of dependence as it does, demands a cause. No system is complete until it has given an answer to this demand, and *Kant's* answer, after the repeated inconsistencies in which he is involved have once been exposed, is no longer satisfactory. So the idea of a first cause, which is the only way to avoid the self-contradiction of a series of causes, strengthened as it is in its claims to probability by the problem of the freedom of the will already presented, receives no adequate explanation, and must be passed down to *Kant's* successors for solution.

The third argument, the teleological, is more interesting and more important, inasmuch as it suggests the idea once more of a genuine use of the principle of causality considered as the concept of efficient causation. In the briefest form it is this (p. 496 and espec. 498): The multitude of the evidences of systematic contrivance in the world, permits us to reason to one wise and free contriver as their cause. *Kant* makes the argument somewhat fuller than this by his form of statement, and especially in that he seeks to make it more perfect as an argument for the existence of a God, in distinction from a mere contriver. So far as this is grounded upon the principle of causality, it may be expressed briefly in this form: that the more we study the effects of this cause, the higher our idea of it as their adequate ("proportionirt") source becomes, until we are lost in wonder over the greatness of its nature.

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[1] *Kant* gives a statement of the necessary elements of the argument p. 488.

Kant's rejection of this argument as a proof is short, and from his standpoint, conclusive. This is a use of the principle of causality beyond the limits of experience, and as such a fully unjustifiable one. True, nothing hinders us from *supposing* the existence of a God (p. 532, cf. 509), but he will have us *know* nothing of it. He says: "I maintain now that all attempts to use the reason in respect to theology in a speculative manner, are entirely fruitless" (p. 506). "All the principles" (viz. the synthetical principles of the pure understanding,) "are only of immanent validity, that is, they have reference merely to objects of empirical knowledge, or to phenomena. Therefore *nothing is accomplished* by the transcendental employment of a merely speculative reason upon theology" (pp. 507, 508).

But this refutation of the argument is of no value, as it seems to us, because it commits the fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi*. *Kant* says the argument is invalid because one cannot *apply the categories* beyond the limits of experience. *But the teleological argument is not an application of the categories.* So the argument is left untouched, and its validity still remains to be decided upon.

We say, this argument is not an application of the categories. The category of causation refers exclusively to the invariable sequence of antecedent and consequent but this is an argument for *efficient* causation. Just as *Kant* really derives the existence of the *Ding an sich* from an application of the principle of causality which is *not* an application of the categories, — from an element of the principle which is not contained in them, so here the argument has no connection with the categories, and transcends them in quite a different sense from that which *Kant* had in mind. The question of the validity of this argument is therefore really handed down untouched by *Kant* to his successors, except so far as its solution may be regarded as suggested by the argument upon the *Ding an sich.*

Meanwhile *Kant* contributes certain elements to the further decision which they are to make. He uses very strong expressions as to the convincing power of these arguments especially the teleological. He says: "This proof deserves at all times to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest, clearest, and most suitable for the common understanding of men. It gives life to the study of nature, in the same way that it has its own origin in this study, and thereby it attains new power. It puts purpose and plan where our observation would not, of itself, have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature by the clue of an especial unity the principle of which is exterior to nature. And this knowledge reacts upon its cause viz. the idea which gives rise to it, and increases the belief in a highest originator to an irresistible conviction. It would therefore be not only disheartening, but also entirely in vain to attempt to detract from the credit of this proof" (p. 497). "If one asks whether there is anything distinct from the world which contains the ground of the order of the world, and its organisation according to general laws, the answer is: *Without doubt*. For the world is a sum of phenomena; there must be therefore some transcendental ground of the same, that is, one thinkable only to the pure reason" (p. 547). "Can we assume a single wise and all-powerful originator of the world? *Without any doubt;* and not only this, but we *must* presuppose such a one" (p. 548). He compares the belief which we may have in a God with one upon which we are willing to *wager* all that we have, and says that although we are often made to waver in our faith by doubts, yet we always return to it without exception (pp. 636, 637). Yet the teleological proof taken alone leads strictly to the idea of a world-builder only, limited by the materials upon which he worked, and not of a creator (p. 500).

But after all this *Kant* still rejects all arguments of the reason as furnishing any contributions to our knowledge upon the subject of theology. They transcend their sphere, and therefore are unable to contribute anything to settled knowledge. The moral argument, however, which he advances in the Pure Reason, but developes more at length in the Practical Reason, is in its own sphere of greater power. Nothing can make it waver (pp. 629, 638), but through it we attain perfect certainty both of the existence of God, and of a future life.[1]

§13. We think we discover at this point the great weakness of *Kant's* system as a whole. On moral grounds he postulates something which is the object of a certain belief. On intellectual grounds he comes to an irresistible conviction, which if it may waver at times, is yet a conviction to which the mind returns again and again. To the former he allows a legitimacy which he does not to the latter. The latter only arrives at probability, and cannot have that demonstrative evidence which mathematics possess, or that immediate certainty which the law of causality in its application to phenomena presents. Therefore it is nothing. But, if the practical reason rests upon the supposition that the universe is a consistent whole, and that, where there is a command, there must be also all that is involved in that command, — a just judge, and a sphere where it may be perfectly realized, what further presupposition is made when one says that the universe is a consistent whole, and therefore, when the mind leads by a necessity of thought over the bounds of possible experience, there should be supposed to be objects corresponding to this necessity which, though they cannot be presented in an intuition, and thus become an object of immediate certainty, may yet be reasonably held to exist upon the evidence of this necessity of thought? Surely it is not scientific to demand in behalf of such supposed transcendent objects an amount of evidence which the nature of the case forbids. But 'is not this done when it is demanded that, if they are to be accepted as objects of knowledge in any sense, they should become objects of experience, that is, give up their whole transcendent character?

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[1] The existence of God is a "postulate" of the practical reason (P. V. p. 149 ff.). We may affirm positively that he *is*, and indeed we may go further than this; for the postulates of the practical reason will include, at least a certain knowledge, of the divine attributes (p. 157.). Granting that the reasonings of the speculative reason have any cogent force, they could only teach us that God was *very* wise, and *very* powerful &c. But the practical reason demands, as a presupposition, that he is *all*-wise, &c. (p. 167 ff.).

Thus our subject leads us finally to this topic: In what sense, and to what extent may the philosopher assume at the beginning of his speculations that the universe forms a consistent whole? And this question will be the most important one which *Kant's* successors will have to answer.

§ 14. We are now about to pass over to the consideration of *Herbart*. We pause long enough to sum up briefly the results of our study of *Kant*, dividing them into three classes of which the first is:

1. Points in the doctrine of causality which *Kant* may be considered to have conclusively established. They are:

a. The principle of cause and effect is an a priori endowment of the mind, and is necessary to constitute experience.

b. The transcendent use of the principle of causality is necessary to a full understanding of the world of experience, and its use in such a way is justifiable. We refer here particularly to the *Ding an sich*, and the soul.

2. Points which *Kant* has failed to prove, and thereby given cause for the suspicion that their contraries are true.

a. The transcendental ideality of space and time.

b. The non-applicability of the category of causality beyond the realm of experience. Not only may we reason to the *existence* of the *Ding an sich*, but this failure of *Kant's* affords some probability that the *Ding an sich* may be connected by a system of laws corresponding to the laws of nature as observed in experience and interpreted according to the law of causality.

c. The Impossibility of a system of preëstablished harmony between the course of nature *an sich*, and our representations. Particularly also

d. The chaotic condition of our representations when given to us before operated upon by the laws of the mind.

e. The invalidity of the teleological argument for the existence of God.

3. Suggestions made by *Kant's* arguments demanding a special consideration from those who will advance the doctrine of causality from the point where he has left it.

a. Are judgements which possess immediate evidence of necessity and universality, therefore to be considered a priori elements of knowledge?

b. A complete formulation of the principle of causality.
c. Relation of time to causality.
d. How is freedom consistent with the law of causality?
e. Is there a valid cosmological argument for the existence of God?
f. What is the fundamental presupposition of a sound system of philosophy?

HERBART.

§ **15.** Although *Herbart* was a pupil of *Fichte* at Jena, he did not accept the system of his teacher. His opposition to *Fichte* did not limit itself to a few subordinate points, while following in the main in the track of the master, but he built his system upon different foundations. He considered *Fichte's* error fundamental, and says of it (*Werke Bd. III* p. 268): "*Fichte* had not sufficient acquaintance with mathematics and physics to make use of them in his speculations. But he was familiar with the postulates of *Kant* in his Practical Reason, and he regarded these as a goal which he must reach. By this means his speculations were biased, and he was led to favor the wholly erroneons doctrine of *Reinhold,* as if practical precepts could ever flow from theoretical doctrines of mental life, or ethics ever become the supplement of metaphysics. This great mistake which could never be repaired, pervaded *Fichte's* entire teaching, corrupted his doctrine of natural rights, and his ethics, and ever held up before him the plan of a "*Wissenschaftslehre*", which, because that which *ought* to be, never determines that which *is*, and that which *is,* never that which *ought* to be, is an impossibility."

Such an objection of course touches *Kant* almost as much as *Fichte,* and we should expect to find what we actually do, that *Herbart* criticises *Kant* and departs equally widely from his system. In *Herbart's* view the great error of *Kant* was that he started wrongly. His foundation was the empirical psychology of his day (cf. III, 154, 155), and instead of subjecting this to criticism in its most elementary conceptions, he assumed the whole doctrine of "faculties" ("*Vermögen*" III, 128) in the soul (Imagination, Understanding &c.) which *Herbart* considered himself to have refuted.[1] True, for the immediate inquiry before us, this error was not of particular importance, for *Herbart* says (III, 129); "No doctrine was corrupted through the analogy with the old psychology except that of the matter of experience". And he proceeds: "If one sets this unfortunate attempt aside, the question as to the forms of the faculty of knowledge remains one well worthy of consideration, yes, an indispensable one, viz. the distinction between form and matter of experience in general. It was very necessary to note that space and time, as well as the concepts of substance and cause, are characteristic elements of the objects of experience which by no means lie immediately in the sensations, that is, in the matter of experience. Are then those characteristic elements really given? Have the metaphysical questions which relate to them an object? or are they empty fancies? — To have called attention to this subject is one of the greatest services *Kant* has rendered."

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[1] R. V. p. 515. What is here said about the "*Grundkraft*" shows that *Kant* had thought upon the subject which *Herbart* here touches, although perhaps time had failed him to examine it.

But *Herbart* criticises *Kant* in a matter which is more closely connected with our subject, viz. upon his whole conception of knowledge through a priori ideas. He says (I, 217, 218): "*Kant* did well to call our attention in the preface to the Pure Reason to Copernicus. But he was not right when he added: 'If the intuition must be governed by the nature of the objects, I cannot see how any one could know anything about that nature a priori. But if the object, as an object of the senses, is governed by the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can conceive quite easily of this possibility'. This opinion is something as if one should look for the explanation of the error in the apparent rising and setting of the sun in the arrangement of the human eye. The eyes have as little to do with it as the sun. *The incorrectness of the apparent phenomenon is to be ascribed to the position of the observer in reference to that which he has to observe.* The deceptive appearance caused by this position is the thing in need of correction, and this is performed by science." Thus *Herbart* would destroy the fundamental idea of the Pure Reason, and with it, the whole Kantian doctrine as to the transcendent use of the principle of causality.

§ **16.** *Herbart's* own system begins at the point suggested by this criticism of *Kant*. He purposes to take every fundamental idea which the common conceptions of men contain, and subject it to the most careful criticism, and thus upon a solid basis of purified and correct ideas, build up a system which shall have no presuppositions, and take nothing for granted, which it is not necessary, in the nature of thought itself, to take. Philosophy is to him *The Revision of our Ideas* (*"Die Bearbeitung des Begriffs"*).

Now here lies the first necessary presupposition of his system. *We do know something.* To be sure, this knowledge is in many respects superficial, like our views about the rising and setting of the sun. But there is a basis of truth to it, at which we are capable of arriving by patient and thorough study. Our common ideas contain contradictions, as for example the idea of being, of change, of physical causation, and even of the Ego. But when they are exposed, the mind is capable of resolving them, and the product arrived at is *knowledge.*[1] *Herbarts's* method will appear in the sequel. We have now only to fix his fundamental thought in mind, that the problem of philosophy is no vain and impossible one, but that it is to gain a comprehension, thorough and reliable, of that which is given to the mind through experience, and that this can be done (III, 353).

This was also *Kant's* primary supposition. Yet *Herbart* suggests to us more than *Kant*, inasmuch as he extends his researches wider, and every where, whether in the field of experience, of rational psychology, or of ethics, follows the same method, expressly rejecting *Kant's* division of these fields between the Logic, the Dialectic, and the Practical Reason. In a sense in which it was not true of *Kant, Herbart* teaches by the drift of his whole system that the philosopher is to assume the whole system of the universe to constitute a consistent whole, and that it is in all its parts to be comprehended by the exercise of the human reason. This we are to bear in mind as the first contribution of *Herbart's* to the greatest question left us by *Kant* (cf. §§ 13, 14 above).

§ 17. The first point of importance for us in *Herbart's* ontology is to gain an accurate idea of what is meant by the word "given" in his philosophy.

Herbart says (IV, 18): "Neither all, nor one is given. But things, or combinations of qualities are actually produced by the natural psychological mechanism, leaving over-refinements out of the question. And it is the case with us all that we consider these things as extended in space, as changeable, as exerting and receiving power." "This which is given", he further says, "is real and not a mere empty possibility. It is the object of metaphysics not merely to think but to know. What does not have something to do with knowledge is foreign to it; everything in it must have a relation, mediate, or immediate, to reality." The question then is, What is this real, lying in that which is given to us and to which metaphysics must have constant reference?

We may divide that which is given into two elements, matter and form. The matter is given in the sensations &c (IV, 21). This is a fact conceded by all and never disputed. But what is the case with the forms? for example, with time, space, and causality? These are also given, according to *Herbart.* As this statement is of the utmost consequence to our investigation we shall prove it at some length, taking for our basis the presentation of the subject in the "Introduction to Philosophy", (chapter V, I, 65—9).

This chapter is devoted to the "higher scepticism" (*"höhere Skepsis"*). Its design is much more to awaken thought and exhibit the problems before the student, than to give precise statements or definite conclusions, and accordingly there is a certain degree of indefiniteness and uncertainty about its positive doctrine.

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1) IV, 26. *"In den Verknüpfungen unserer Vorstellungen .... spiegelt sich allerdings die Verknüpfung der Dinge unter einander und mit uns".*

Herbart first takes into consideration the question whether we really perceive body under the three dimensions of extension. A variety of reasons, as for example, that we are never able to penetrate within the surface of bodies and have perception of their solidity, nor to empty space in itself, are suggested as involving the matter in difficulty. Yet *Herbart* says expressly (p. 67): "Experience is certainly given according to her form, and that completely and definitely, and therefore, for example, the given phenomenon does not simply exist in space, but in definite forms, and at definite intervals in space." The same statements are made of time. In reference to substance the matter is left in an uncertain form by the closing sentence (p. 68): "Since the combination of the qualities of an object is *not perceived,* it must be added by thought, but we know not how" &c. The argument as to causality is fuller though still incomplete. *Herbart* says in substance (p. 69): In every change the succession of time is given. If so the identity of the object before and after the change is given, else we could not combine the different elements into one conception, and hence we could not perceive the succession. But, if the identity of the object in the change of its qualities is given, there arises an immediate contradiction between identity and change, which can be solved only by the idea of causality. The causal relation between the different elements of the observed phenomenon is necessary in order to render change possible. And accordingly the causal relation is given in the phenomenon. From this *given causal relation* arises the *concept of causality* which we form. Attention is next called to the teleological forms of experience, and the question is raised whether these are perceived or added by thought. The answer is that they are not merely added by thought, (that is, arbitrarily, without reason in the object,) but like the other forms are given in experience (p. 70).

§ **18.** It will be noted that there are two distinct ideas here. (1) The causal connection between the phenomena is given. (2) The concept of causality is added by thought (This distinction is made by *Herbart* himself I, 188, 189). Confining our attention to the first point for the present, we have to adduce a few of the many possible passages confirmatory of the position taken.

(1). *Herbart* says (IV, 26): "Are the forms of experience given? Yes, they are certainly given, although only as determinations of the manner in which the sensations are united. If they were not given, we could not merely separate them from the sensations in such a manner that that which we *feel* would be without all *coherence,* but we could also at our pleasure see and hear *other* forms, *other* intervals of time. In like manner we could *compose* things out of qualities and *resolve* them in such a way, at our will that these creations of our mind would enter wholly into the series of phenomena, if only their separate qualities were given in sensations. The point upon which all depends is the *association* of these qualities. *We find ourselves bound by this association,* or checked so soon as we presume to change it. Through this check experience lets us know that it is given *in its form* as well as its matter. And experience exercises this compulsion whether we understand how it is or not." — This argument is simply that the fixity of phenomena proves the objectivity of its forms. The same argument is advanced in many other places, as, for example, IV, 24.

To quote only one more passage (IV, 316): "The forms are certainly given. That is, our sensations do not lie in us in a loose aggregate, or like a chaos, but in the very fact of their being given, they form themselves into distinct groups, and series, and only in this defined form, can we appeal to them as to a given phenomenon."

Let us pause here to note that *Herbart* thus pronounces irrevocably for the doctrine of the transcendent use of causality. The things which are given in experience, and of which he is speaking, are *Kant's Dinge an sich,* for he is standing, up to this point, entirely upon the basis of the ordinary ideas of men. In respect to these ultimate objects as they are in themselves, and not merely in our mind, he says that they sustain causal relations with one another, that their changes are all governed by the law of causality, and hence it follows that this principle may he employed, as he does employ it in the sequel constantly, to reveal and define their nature. This position has a consistency which *Kant's* had not, and relieves us from a difficulty into which *Kant* fell (cf. § 6 above), by maintaining on the one hand the existence of the *Ding an sich,* and by denying on the other the transcendental validity of the forms.

§ **19.** (2). Passing now to the second of the two elements of the matter, let us consider the concept of causality as added by thought to the perceptions of experience. This operation is performed, according to *Herbart,* by a necessity of thought.

Herbart's position here is a consequence of his whole system of philosophy. He starts out with the assumption that we know something (IV, 311). His object is to make that knowledge consistent and clear, and he purposes to do it in accordance with the laws of thinking as they actually exist. Hence the space which he devotes to the fundamental presupposition of the law of Ground and Consequence (IV, 30 ff.). He endeavors to clear this of all inconsistencies and ambiguities, illustrates it from the mathematics, develops it in the form: The ground stands in relations with the consequence; and explains this: The ground demands to pass over into the consequence. But he never questions the principle itself, or endeavors to bring any proof for it. It lies embodied in all experience and it is the necessary presupposition of what is necessarily assumed, the fact of consistent thought. Now in reference to causality, this is but a case under the doctrine of ground and consequence. As soon as a change occurs it is a consequence, and demands a ground, or cause. And accordingly, if the mind must think in the line of ground and consequence, it must also think in the line of cause and effect (His argument is suggested rather than stated, IV, 12).

But definite statements of *Herbart's* position upon this point are not wanting. The causal relation exists between the phenomena, but the concept of causality is formed upon a contemplation of the phenomena through a necessity of thought. Hume, he says (I, 66), looked for the *impressions* to which the idea of causality corresponds, and of course found nothing. But he could have found *something else,* viz. "the *necessity* of demanding *some* cause for the effect". More boldly he says (I, 292): "Question: With what right do we pass beyond the world of experience? Answer: With the right which experience itself gives us when it *compels* us to do so." As his ripest and fullest expression of the matter we may quote a passage referred (I, 187) to by himself, viz., "Changed objects are presented to the common man in his experience. He however transfers the responsibility of the change upon some thing else and different, which *must* have been present as a cause, in order to produce the new, which could not have appeared in the old of itself. In this way the concept of causality arises. It is produced in a necessary process of thought, the necessity of which *does not have its seat in the soul*[1], but arises in the given phenomena as often as the contradictory form, called change, takes place in the world of sense. Things, as they are, compel us to this concept. We cannot think them without it, or in any other way except by it.

In certain passages the concept of causality is viewed as an axiomatic postulate, as for example (I, 216. cf. IV. 61, 69, 70); "If there *were* nothing, neither would anything *seem* to be."

§ **20.** When the expressions of *Herbart* are carefully considered, the result of these studies is somewhat obscured by a certain vagueness. The causal relation is given in the phenomena, and when we observe phenomena in such a relation, we are compelled to seek an explanation of what would otherwise be a contradiction, and this explanation is the concept of causality. It might seem that *Herbart* here took his stand upon the ground of the sensualists. John Stuart Mill could employ the same expressions. Is the "necessity" merely that of seeking an explanation? and is this explanation through causality simply the one upon which we do *in the actual fact* all fall? Or, does the necessity extend also to the conclusion, so that this is the only *possible* explanation? If the former is the case, then the principle of causality is not an a priori form of the mind, and it is not necessary "to make experience possible". The intimate connection of the doctrine of cause and effect with that of ground and consequence, as well as many single expressions, shows that this is not *Herbart's* meaning, but his language is open to this misunderstanding, and in so far he has failed to give a satisfactory statement to the principle of causality. We are to hold fast to the result gained under *Kant,* that the principle of causality is truly a priori, and we must now seek to incorporate with it that which was strongly suggested to us by *Kant's*

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1) It might seem that these words contradict the whole argument which we are here advancing. It is, however, a careless form of expression, a frequent fault of *Herbart's.* He means: has not its seat *exclusively* in the soul, is not a mere fiction, or imagination.

doctrine of the *Ding an sich*, and has been clearly brought out by *Herbart*, in his doctrine that the forms are given, in a form of statement which shall satisfy the one element of truth as well as the other. This problem *Herbart* hands down to *Lotze* for solution.

§ 21. The fact that *Herbart* taught the doctrine of the transcendental use of the principle of causality is now sufficiently clear. It only remains for us now to follow him in his actual application of the principle, and see it in the modifications which it undergoes in the course of his investigations.

A *thing*, as the word is used in common speech, is defined by *Herbart* as a complex of qualities (I, 175 ff.). We commonly suppose a connecting band which unites them, and so forms a *thing*, and we often distinguish between the substance of a thing and its qualities. Still that by which we know a thing, and distinguish it from other things, is its qualities. At this point arises a peculiar phenomenon. Certain qualities disappear from a thing, and others appear upon it, which are sometimes exactly opposite to the qualities which appeared there before. The thing becomes a different thing from what it was before, although in some respects the same. This is the phenomenon of change.

Now, change is possible in three ways (I, 194 ff.): first, through an *external* cause; second, through an *internal* cause; or, third, *without* cause. These ways are all alike unthinkable.

In case of the *external* cause, if a change have a cause, this cause is itself a change, and requires for itself a cause, and so on *ad infinitum*. And still further, none of these causes is considered as such that it would effect anything of itself. It works *if* it is itself operated upon. This series considered as a whole, in its entire infinity, is therefore *at rest*, and produces nothing, so that no change can be explained by it. Now, it is true that, since causality does not depend upon time, if we assume a working principle, to which action belongs in its very nature, and accordingly without need of any interposing cause, this difficulty disappears. But it only disappears to reappear in another form, viz. the difficulty of conceiving of the action of any active principle upon a passive one. This is inconceivable so far as the active principle is considered. This, in order to be active must go out of itself, and act upon a foreign thing. It therefore demands and presupposes this foreign thing in order that it may be that which it is, viz. an active thing. Yet it is what it is in and of itself, as every other principle or thing is. Here then is a contradiction. It is what it is in and of itself, and still it presupposes and demands another thing in order that it may be what it is. Similarly it is true of the passive power, that it is as passive the same, and not the same with itself.

The case of the *internal* cause stands no better. That which undergoes change is itself the condition and cause of the change, or determines itself. It is accordingly the determined, and the determining. The former finds the cause of its determination in the latter. As the determining it exerts an activity, which if any change takes place, must have a beginning, and must therefore be itself a change. As a change it demands a cause, that is, as itself determined a second determining something, and this second determining something cannot be an external cause, for we have now excluded external causes from the case. It must be therefore an internal cause, and in like manner demand a third determining cause, &c., *ad infinitum*. And here as before, because the whole series operates in each case only when the preceding member operates, it does so never, and there is no change.

The third case remains, that of change without cause, or absolute change. In this the case of chance must be excluded. That which was for a long period of a certain sort, then suddenly changed its former quality for another, would be clearly a different thing. The change must be conceived of as continuous, out of all past into all future, of equal velocity, and of unchanged direction. Now, this does not agree with our experience. There is no such continuous and steady change. True, there is a certain periodicity to be observed in phenomena, comparable to the revolution of the planets about the sun. But if there were this continuous change, universal periodicity demands an external cause, just as, according to the laws of mechanics, two forces are demanded to produce revolution in a circle. But these considerations aside, the idea of absolute change is itself contradictory. For what is that which is continually changing? Its nature is determined by the changes through which it passes, all its qualities, past, present, and future, must therefore be included in the notion which we form of it, and thus they are brought together in a unity in which they mutually destroy one another. Or if this method of reasoning be declared unsatisfactory, certainly absolute change must be conceived of under the following form, — At every moment that which is passing through this process must destroy itself, and bring forth something which is its own contrary. It was something definite. Just because it was this it must cease to be it and become the precise opposite. If it ceases *utterly* to be the old before the new enters in, the continuity of the whole, and so the absolute change itself, is destroyed. If it does not cease to be what it is before it becomes something else, then the same instant of time embraces cessation and beginning, of which the former is being, and yet no longer being, and the latter is being, and nevertheless not yet being. Or from another point of view, if the absolute change is only the appearance of that which does not itself change, then in the last resort, in order that it may appear as it does, it demands another being before whom it can appear, that is, it is not in itself sufficient unto itself, or, it is what it is in itself, and yet is what it is, only through another, and a foreign thing.

All three members of this trilemma being found impossible, it is therefore shown that there is, and can be no such thing as change. Still there remains the appearance of change in the world, which must be explained.

We have given this long passage for the purpose of exhibiting

Herbart's method in all its logical rigor, in order that we may feel the difficulties of the situation as *Herbart* felt them, and be better prepared to appreciate his resolution. And yet, what an astonishing piece of reasoning! How unconvincing! It rests for the most part upon definitions, which while apparently discriminating, prove themselves, the longer they are studied, the more artificial and sophistical.

Let us proceed now to sketch *Herbart's* solution of the difficulty.

§ 22. The impossibility of the common idea of a thing possessed of many different attributes has already been exhibited by *Herbart* (I, 186). He has now shown the impossibility of change in such a thing, and by uniting these two results, confirmed by further reasoning of the same sort, he obtains his doctrine that being, in the strict and scientific use of the term, must be simple and unchangeable (I, 216 ff). His "simple being" is comparable with *Leibnitz's* "monad", although differing from it in very important respects. Still, it is, like that, without relations to space and time, and may be (*"zufällige Ansicht"*) conceived of under the form of a sphere. By original motion such simple beings are brought into contact (called *"zusammen"*, I, 263), and supposing them to be of the form of a sphere, and this contact to take place as two spheres may meet in space, the motion which they have gives them a tendency to cut, or penetrate (*"durchdringen"*), each other. This penetration must be conceived of under the idea of a mutual modification whereby each simple being would become different from what it was before. But change is impossible, and accordingly each seeks to maintain itself (*"sich erhalten"*), and continues therefore in its own unchangeable quality. By the help of the *"zufällige Ansicht"* we may say that the two spheres seek to become concentric, and are repelled by one another. In this way without change, change is produced in the simple being. It maintains itself, and remains what it was before, and yet it maintains itself in a different way according to the nature of the different simple beings which come in contact with it.[1] In this way groups of monads are produced possessing individual character, and by the combination of successive groups of these monads, matter is built up. When now a case of apparent change occurs, as, for example, when two chemical substances combine to form a new one, there is no change in the monads, but simply a change in their relations to one another, that is, motion and displacement between the monads. New combinations of monads produce new molecular groups, in which the original and unchangeable monads appear under different modifications, and the new molecular groups unite to form new substances. What really occurs, then, in supposed cases of change, is only, change of motion, which may be, for all we know, no change at all,

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1) cf. IV, 137 ff. I do not think this is stated too strongly, yet in this form it becomes instantly evident that *Herbart* had here equally as good reason for establishing a contradiction as in the common idea of a thing with many qualities. Different *modifications* in a simple being are as contradictory as different *qualities*.

but simply the regular continuance of what has always proceeded according to the same law of motion; and change in the manner of self-maintenance in the monads is only change in the manner of not changing, that is, is no change.

§ 23. The above is sufficient to enable us to understand and appreciate the negative definitions of causality which *Herbart* proceeds now to give (IV, 142 f.). He says: "Causes are not transeunt, for the monads which in opposition to one another maintain each itself, give and take nothing from one another." That is, there is no such thing as an active cause, or a passive effect. "Causes are not immanent, for each monad is the cause of the self-maintenance of the other." "They have no transcendental freedom, for the self-maintenance follows without exception, if the monads are only once in contact." "Causes are no laws of succession in time, for if the monads once come into contact, the whole process of disturbance and self-maintenance follows without occupying the least portion of time." "They lie in no special faculties, for causality arises from the opposition which exists *between* the monads, but which exists *in no one* of them taken separately." "They lie in no inner tendency or impulse, for no monad is defective, or needs supplementing." "They consist in no special powers." "There is no absolute change or substitution for causation." "There is no fate."

§ 24. We have thus given the doctrine of *Herbart* as to the transcendental use of the principle of causality, and seen him apply it to the material world till it has resulted in a considerable modification of the ordinary conception of causality. *Herbart* maintained in the strongest possible way the doctrine that the principle could, and must be applied transcendently, and held the human mind competent, in reliance upon it, to penetrate to the secret recesses of the material world, and discover its most recondite laws, although he was obliged to modify the ordinary conception of the principle, as was the case with many other conceptions. Let us now follow him in his consideration of the soul, and the doctrine of God.

§ 25. From the standpoint of speculative metaphysics *Herbart's* doctrine here is as clear as in respect to the most ordinary things in the material world. The soul is a monad (V, 108 ff.), and in respect to its formal nature exactly the same as every other monad. It has one simple and unchangeable quality. What this is, and in what respects it is distinguished from a monad which may be the governing principle of a molecule of sugar, we do not know, for it remains forever unknown, whether as an object of speculative or empirical psychology. The same laws of causation apply to it as to all other monads, and its ideas are only its maintenance of itself. Accordingly from a speculative standpoint, the question of freedom and causality through freedom, is once for all and without further debate, concluded.

Aside from this metaphysical speculation, *Herbart* brings forward some other reasons against the idea of freedom of the will (I, 201 ff.

211 ff.). The idea of self-determination of the will is the idea of change from an internal cause, and like that falls immediately into the impossible form of an infinite series. And this absurdity is still further increased by the idea that this infinite series should occur in the nature of a finite being like man. Even if the doctrine were true, it would be an injurious one, for upon this supposition man has no character, every individual volition standing for itself, and his whole moral life being but a loose aggregate of isolated acts. It also destroys the idea of virtue. A man is virtuous because he acts according to his view of right. But if the will be self-determined, then it is not determined by the view of right which the individual may have, but is an entirely arbitrary thing, and hence is without moral character (For *Herbart's* longer discussion of this subject, see IX, 241 ff.).

Herbart thus contributes his part towards settling the question raised by the theories of *Kant* in reference to the consistency of freedom with the law of causality by denying freedom. But this is too violent a solution, although the only possible one in *Herbart's* system. The universal conviction of men that they are free in the very sense disputed by *Herbart*, leads us to reject this explanation, and with it to reject his arguments in reference to the absolute change.[1]

§ **26.** Were *Herbart* to apply his philosophy to religion, it would be impossible for him to construct a doctrine of God. This exalted Being would become, according to his doctrine of contradictions, a monad like other simple beings, of a single simple quality, and unchangeable nature. He could not be the Creator of the World, or in any sense its cause, because if he preceded it, and himself formed the whole sum of existence, there could never arise a world from an unchangeable monad, whose only power consisted in self-maintenance. *Herbart's* monad would be far more incompetent than *Leibnitz's*, for that of the latter philosopher had within itself at least the whole series of ideas, which necessarily ran through its course, and might be regarded as a potential universe, while on the contrary not the first idea could arise in *Herbart's* monad, and not the first trace of consciousness, for in the absence of all other monads, there could be no "contact", no self-maintenance, and consequently no idea, much less an act.

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[1] The arguments and general position of *Herbart* remind one strongly of the American philosopher Jonathan Edwards (1703—1758). He also lays especial emphasis upon the idea of the infinite series as an argument against an "undetermined" will. But he seeks to satisfy the instinctive belief of the soul in its own freedom in the following manner. (1) The soul is absolutely free in its volitions. It has the "natural ability" to choose either of two opposing courses of action, and when it has chosen the one, has the consciousness that it could have chosen the other, and that the power determining its action was itself. (2) But the will acts under motives. These are of two sorts: subjective, which includes the frame of mind, the previous history as resulting in the character of the individual &c. &c.; and objective, desirable things presented to the will, as for example a glass of water, &c. &c. These motives have a *strength* of their own, which to a being sufficiently wise is capable of calculation and expression in exact form. Motives can thus be compared, and one can be declared stronger than another. (3) The will follows the strongest motive. Hence it is possible when one knows *all* the subjective and objective motives exactly to predict the action of the will. (4) But these motives are only *occasions* of the action of the will, not *causes*. (5) Hence the fact that the will always follows the strongest motive is a *usage*, and not a *law*, a *fact*, and not a *necessity*. The will is *determined*, thus avoiding the infinite series, but not *compelled*, thus avoiding fatalism. So far as the determination of action is concerned, *Edward's* view is quite reconcilable with that of *Kant*, provided we may understand *Kant's* law of causality as no more than a law of the *occasional connection* of phenomena.

Herbart seems to have recognized this, for he says (IV, 616): "The objectionable and artificial character of the attempt to give theories which were formed only for objects of our human investigation an extension in which they should apply to the infinite, is insufferably repugnant . . . . The prying curiosity which desires theoretically to master the highest of all objects, instead of defining it according to natural ideas, has always been so foreign from the author's style of thinking, that he becomes estranged from his metaphysics the moment they are subjected by way of experiment to such a misuse" (cf. III, 132). For this reason we find no extended consideration of natural theology in his writings, and indeed only the most scanty fragments suggestive of his ideas upon the subject.

As to the existence of God, *Herbart* advances the evidences of adaptation which are found in the world, as a sufficient proof of it (IV, 613). As soon as the existence of adaptation in the world is acknowledged, it is seen that adaptation presupposes choice, and choice presupposes a chooser, an artificer. But when an artificer brings monads into contact and separates them, and consequently produces in them distinct self-maintenance, or restrains them from it, he is the maker of substance, and on the whole the maker of nature.[1] The unity of his designs suggests his own unity, and the evidences of benevolence suggest his benevolent character.

Now, this argument may be called a hypothesis in distinction from a strenuous demonstration (I, 277 ff.) but it is an exceedingly strong one. Every one believes in the existence of other men, and yet he arrives at this belief only in the same way, by explaining the actions which seem to be evidences of adaption as resulting from an adapting mind. Observation is the basis of this argument, and probability leads to the conclusion. *Herbart* does not regard it as a weaker one than the more rigorous arguments of metaphysics, because it is an argument from probability, for he says (III, 143): "A strong probability is in every case more powerful and useful than rigorous knowledge itself. For it is possible to raise objections against every piece of knowledge, and the most rigorous demonstration, so soon as it is too long to be con-

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1) Here we should compare (IV, 620) "*Uebrigens ist Schöpfung der Substanzen nicht Schöpfung der einfachen Realen*". — which leaves the real position of God in the universe very doubtful.

veniently taken in at one glance, gives us nothing but probability. — *Herbart* speaks also of a belief in the existence of God arising from our religious nature, and our moral needs (I, 277, 279. IV, 617, 619).

Herbart gives certain nearer definitions of God's nature. He ascribes to him unity, personality, and omnipotence, because these ideas are necessary if God is to be a being upon whom our faith can rest. The whole idea of God must be composed from the simple moral ideas, that is, God must be wise and holy, which two ideas together form that of internal freedom. God is not, however, free in the sense of possessing a self-determining will (I, 212). He must possess, further, omnipotence as the highest perfection; pure and all-embracing love, that is, benevolence; finally justice, especially the so-called distributive justice (distribution of penalties and rewards) (I, 158).

It will be noted that while *Herbart* does not defend it as a strictly philosophical proceeding, still his argument for the existence of God, so far as it is entitled to that name, is a transcendent use of the principle of causality, and that in a sense in which he has not previously acknowledged the principle, in the sense of a transeunt cause. This is an advance upon his doctrine as contained in the consideration of nature, and yet it still remains uncertain whether this higher Being is really an efficient cause, for that he is the original source of all things *Herbart* does not say, and that he has free will in the proper sense of the words, *Herbart* denies. We do not know, according to *Herbart's* theory but what, after all, he is only a part of a universe, of which the material and spiritual world forms the second part, and the counterpart of God. And whether the contradictions of absolute change and immanent development would have again to be met in consideration of this two sided universe or not, is a question we are left without help in deciding.

Herbart's philosophy, therefore, breaks entirely down in his remarks upon God, unless we are to leave it out of account, and view him, so soon as he begins upon this subject, as standing upon the same basis as the ordinary man. And if so, then we shall scarcely excuse him for having left it in his consideration of causation as applied to the objects of the material world.[1]

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1) We do not think that the most excellent treatise on *"Religionsphilosophie"* of the venerated *Prof. Drobisch* can be urged as a proof that it is possible to frame a doctrine of God within the limits of the system of *Herbart*. *Prof. Drobisch* claims that his treatise is in entire harmony with the spirit of *Herbart's* Philosophy, in that it takes for its problem exactly what *Herbart* advances as the problem of all philosophy, "to comprehend that which is given" (Rel. Phil. p. 30). This we gladly admit. But if *Herbart* is to apply his philosophy to the doctrine of God *in the same sense* in which he applies it to the things of the world (which he does not profess to do, as we have seen above,) that is, if he attemps to comprehend God *as he is in himself*, does he not fall into the difficulties presented above? And does not *Prof. Drobisch* himself acknowledge as much when he says: "The question can only be *how we have to conceive of God in relation to ourselves*". (p. 189).

Herbart makes one remark with which we will close our consideration of his natural theology (I, 277): "It may be a question whether religion suffers any essential loss through the lack of a scientific doctrine of God, or whether it would gain anything if God stood before us in sharp speculative outline, plainly revealed to the strenuous and truth-loving investigator. Religion rests upon humility, and thankful adoration. Humility is favored by a knowledge of our ignorance. Thankfulness cannot be greater than towards the originator of the conditions of our reasonable being. Adoration cannot look higher than to the immeasurably exalted One".

§ 27. (cf. § 14, above) If we now attempt to estimate the elements contributed by *Herbart* to the development of our theme, we shall find that he has essentially advanced it, but that he has by no means given a satisfactory or complete doctrine of it. He has (1) maintained, though not faultlessly, both of the great principles which we regarded *Kant* as having established, the a priori character of the concepts of cause and effect, and the propriety and necessity of its transcendent use. (2) In those positions in which *Kant* failed to maintain his doctrine, and thereby left us under the impression that there was much to be said for the opposing side, *Herbart* has given us much light. The fact that the forms of space and time and causality are *given,* that is, their transcendental validity, he has clearly brought out. He has maintained the applicability of the principle of causality beyond the range of phenomena, and has studied the interior modifications of matter by its aid. And yet here, the peculiar results with which he has concluded his investigations, in reference to the monads, and the limitations he has put upon causality by his further definitions of it, excite our suspicions and impair our confidence. He has been more successful in maintaining the possibility and necessity of that system of preëstablished harmony between nature and the mind which *Kant* so confidently but so weakly rejects. And through his non-metaphysical discussions he has done much to strengthen our conviction of the validity of the teleological argument for the existence of God. But (3) his success in answering the questions raised by the Kantian argument is more inconsiderable. His attempts at a formulation of the principle of causality leave us confused and unsatisfied. The relation of time to causality he defines by rejecting all such relation, and the consistency of freedom with causality he solves by denying freedom. Nor has he given any *one* all-embracing and fundamental presupposition which Philosophy may reasonably make.

Evidently, then, much remains to his successors, and we turn with interest to *Lotze* for the instruction which we have not been able to gain from *Herbart*.

LOTZE.

§ 28. *Lotze* divided his Logic into three parts, the third of which treats of knowledge. As the Logic is the first volume in his "System of Philosophy", and as the second volume is to consider the questions of ontology, he is naturally led to consider the question of knowledge entirely apart from the question whether there is a real world external to us or not. There is a world of ideas in which we move, which exists, whether the external world exists or not, and which demands to be understood. What now are the laws of mind, and what the necessary principles it must employ, and how far can it attain to knowledge within this internal world? To these questions *Lotze* addresses himself. And yet he is led almost immediately, for reasons we shall see, to let fall this distinction between an inner and an outer world.[1]

§ 29. In Logic, when we attempt to establish a certain proposition, our process consists in carrying it back to some other proposition, the correctness and truth of which are *presupposed*. We pursue the same course in common life, only that in the various reasonings which we perform, we do not seek to found all our knowledge upon any *one*, but employ *innumerable* such propositions. One of these may be pressed upon us by a necessity of thought; another may express an observed fact; another may be a general proposition whose origin we could not exhibit, and yet which is confirmed the moment we apply it; and another may be of unknown origin and quite unprovable, yet it presses itself upon us because it satisfies some necessity of our spiritual or mental being. In our management of these different propositions we proceed very arbitrarily, changing our position constantly, and selecting our starting point according as this or that proposition has for the moment the greatest psychological certainty. The same truth holds good in scientific thought, though our method of proceeding is not quite so unsystematic. Scarcely a single investigation is ever brought to end except that it rests upon certain principles which are taken for granted, whether as unprovable or derived from other sciences, as self-evident or possessing the highest probability. Different sciences are thus mutually dependent, and form together a body of knowledge which rests, in the last analysis, upon the presupposition of an eternal truth, or an enclosed circle of truths, only a small part of which ever stands, at one time before the eye of the thinker.

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[1] *Lotze* affords us the advantage of having given us in his *"System"* a well connected view of his doctrine. As this is the latest and maturest expression of his views, we shall take little notice of his other writings, referring only to the *"Mikrokosmus"*, and this only in confirmation or development of subordinate points, or as a substitute for the third, alas unwritten, volume of the System.

The science of Logic subjects such propositions, which to other sciences are the principles upon which investigation rests, themselves to an investigation. Were it completed, it would have established a continuous circle of highest truths from which all the propositions applicable in our investigations could be derived with exact exhibition of their meaning and the limitations within which they were to be used. *Lotze* proposes to attempt a "modest part" of this task in seeking to define the grounds upon which the certainty of such truths rests for us subjectively, and the distinctive marks by which they may be known. *Their contents and their truth* he leaves for the present uninvestigated (p. 471).

§ **30.** In common life, then, and in the sciences we set out in our course of reasoning with a multitude of presuppositions. Upon them we base our knowledge, and the question as to the value of this knowledge resolves itself into the question: What attitude are we to take in reference to these common and perhaps unavoidable presuppositions? If not that of implicit confidence in them all, is it that of skepticism as to them all?

There are many varieties of skepticism, but whether they consist in the total denial of all truth, or only interpose a universal demurrer against the proof of all truths, they unite in themselves presupposing *some* sort of a truth having validity in itself. Flatly to deny *all* truth, is to presuppose a standard in accordance with which the truth of given statements is denied; and to say of any *one,* or of *all* truth simply that it is *not proved,* is to presuppose some conditions under which it could be regarded as proved, that is, to recognize a settled truth.

Skepticism can thus be compelled to recognize the existence of necessary laws of thought. But now, may we go further with skepticism, and say that these laws may be necessary only *to us,* that in reality they may not *hold,* and that all things may be in themselves quite different from what they necessarily seem to us?

It is impossible, says *Lotze,* to answer this skepticism, for it is a skepticism without ground. Every reason brought to show that it is unjustified will be met with the same doubt again, whether it, in its turn, may not be in reality entirely different from what it appears. We should be justified in turning our backs upon such reasoning, and such a reasoner, and asserting the validity of the confidence which reason puts in itself. This confidence is not to be given up until a reason be assigned for so doing. But *Lotze* prefers to exhibit the inner vacuity of this strange anxiety lest after all everything should be in itself other than it seems to be.

This skepticism has a meaning only when we suppose the existence of an external world with the reality of which our ideas are supposed not to correspond. Now, this is a supposition which does not rest upon immediate perception, for external things are not immediately given to us. It is only a conclusion which is made from the phenomena which are actually presented to us, in order to satisfy the demands of the mind, that is to bring the sum total of our ideas into harmony with itself. Whether then this outer world exists or not, — a question which we are to leave, for the present, undiscussed, — every attempt to settle the question whether, after all, things are as they seem, involves (1) *a presupposition of the competence of the intellect,* and shows (2) that *the proper subject of our investigations can never be anything but the inner harmony of our ideas with one another.* — Here we have the proper foundation of the system of *Lotze.*

To follow out these statements: — (1) Let P represent our entire faculty of knowledge, and Q some other and higher source of knowledge which gives us the absolute truth. If these two sources of knowledge agree in their testimony as to any fact, how can we distinguish between them, in order to know that the one comes from a higher source than the other, and that the latter is sustained by the former? The utterances of our faculty of knowledge have all the appearance of necessary truths, and what more can the utterances of this other source of truth have? The combined utterance of both would accordingly be subject to the same questioning as the utterance of one alone. Suppose now that they disagree, Q giving us the truth. If we are thereby to be convinced of the error of P, Q must have an appearance of greater certainty than P. But this is impossible, since according to the supposition, P appears to us to be *necessary* truth. We have therefore nothing more than two contradictory expressions of the same faculty of knowledge, which would remain in perpetual conflict until, in the same intellect, a higher principle should be found to decide the strife. Even then, to accept this higher utterance of our mind would be to accept the validity of the necessary laws of thought. Hence, if we make any use of our powers of thought, or seek to settle any question as to the truth of their utterances, we must begin by assuming their competence.

(2). Our ideas are all that is given to us. Consequently our thoughts are occupied with the links of connection which exist between them, and when we think that we have discovered a law connecting any two ideas, we have what we call knowledge. If we fall into doubt whether this supposed law is correct, or whether the supposed is identical with the real connection in fact, the meaning of this is that we are in doubt whether the same relation will be found to exist between these two ideas as often as we have them. When we ask whether the relation which thus constantly occurs between two ideas is correct *in fact,* we mean simply to ask whether the relation which thus occurs agrees with our necessary presuppositions. For when we seek to compare our ideas with the fact, we compare them with the world of fact *not* as it is in itself, for *it* never enters into our minds to become a part of our thoughts, but only as we are compelled, in the last resort, and with the exclusion of all possible error, to *think* about it. That is, we compare our ideas with our necessary thoughts. Accordingly we do not, and cannot in our investigation go outside of the world of our own ideas and necessary presuppositions.

This thought is so important that *Lotze* presents it under a second form. What do we mean when we say that any idea is erroneous? Simply that if the one holding this idea could see things as we see them, he would form a different idea about them. But this is simply to say that his view of things is not in harmony with the whole circle of ideas which he *might* possess, not that it is not in harmony with the external world as distinct from all ideas. Even were we introduced by an angel into the world of things of which we are supposed to have false ideas, we could know it in no other way than we do this, and have no other protection against deception than we have here. Indeed to demand any further knowledge of things than we now have is to demand not to *know* the things, but to *be* the things known. "Nothing is simpler than the conviction that every knowing spirit can view everything only as it seems to it, when it looks upon it, not as it seems when no one is looking upon it. He who demands a knowledge which shall be more than a continuous and perfectly connected body of ideas about a thing, and which shall exhaust the thing itself, demands what is not knowledge but something entirely unintelligible. One cannot even say that such a one wishes to know the things, but only to be them. Even so he would not attain his object. If he could become that metal itself, the knowledge of which through ideas does not satisfy him, he would to be sure now *be* the metal, but would so much the more fail to *know* himself as metal. If however a higher power animated him, while he remained metal, he would then, as this metal, know himself only as he would appear to himself in his ideas, but not as he would, if he did *not* make a representation of himself" (p. 485f.).

The whole problem of the doctrine of knowledge is therefore to be solved entirely within the circle of our ideas. We are to let the opposition between our ideas and a world of things entirely drop, and are to seek to find within the former *the ultimate and immovable points of certainty,* and to connect other ideas, which do not possess this quality, with them so that they shall themselves become certain.

§ 31. In the attempt, now, to decide upon the ultimate and fixed points of certainty in our faculty of knowledge, what method shall we adopt? In analogy to our method of proceeding when we wish to put a single element of our knowledge to the test, and investigate its *origin* for this purpose, it has often been proposed to inquire into the origin of our ideas. It has been thought that if we knew the process by which they were formed, we could judge of their truth. But this method is not so applicable to an examination of the whole range of knowledge as to that of a single element. For the two are not of the same sort. When we examine the validity of a *single* truth, we employ as the ground of decision, the whole body of accepted truth which we possess, and which is composed partly of general propositions whose truth we are compelled to presume, partly of facts which have fallen under our observation and partly of the laws of thought. But when we examine the faculty of knowledge itself, that is, these general propositions and laws of thought, we are compelled while examining one to assume the others as the ground of our examination and final decision. And consequently we fall into a circle in reasoning, and really presuppose that which we profess to investigate.[1] Since, now, this circle cannot be avoided, we must frankly admit the fact, and ingenuously commit the fallacy. We must first define our idea of knowledge, and then fix the relation between the knowing subject, and the object of his knowledge in accordance with the more general ideas which govern our thinking, that is, under the metaphysical law according to which we conceive all operation of one element upon another.

Accordingly *Lotze* sets this supposition at the head of his train of thought, and that in the way in which the manifold experience of thought has taught us to formulate it (p. 518 f.): "Wherever that event which we call an influence of one element A upon another B, takes place, of whatever kind A and B may be, this influence *never* consists in this, that a component part *a* or a predicate *a*, or an attribute *a*, belonging to A, becomes separated from it, and, entire, unchanged and independent, passes over to B to connect itself with this, or be taken up by it, and become *its* predicate; but *always* the predicate *a* which arises in, or has belonged to the element A, is only the *ground* on account of which, under presupposition of a relation C existing or arising between A and B, B is compelled to produce a new predicate *C* out of its own nature, and within itself. By what means this necessity of the connection of the predicates of A and B is produced, that is, how it is caused that B must conduct itself with reference to A, further, in what, either in general, or in different cases differently, the relation C consists which is necessary to the production of the influence, — all these questions together with the previous question whether they are even answerable, may be left unconsidered in our present course of thought. It is enough for us to express the formal relation however it may be actually realized. But it follows therefrom that the form of influence *b* can never be independent of the nature of the object B which experiences it; the former changes with the latter, and the same relation C which existed between A and B will produce, if it takes place between two other objects, A and B′, an effect *b*′ in B′ which will be different from *b*. As little is the effect *b* independent of the nature of the operation of the element A, and of the kind of the relation C. It changes with both of these. It will become β when not A but A′ comes into the relation C with B, and β′ when B comes into the relation C′ with A. But *b*, *b*′, β, β′ will always form an inviolable series of events, which are possible only in B, and A and C are to be considered only as the provocatives, which determine which of the many influences possible to the nature of B, and in what succession, shall take place at any moment. If we may use the terms "receptivity" and" spontaneity", every element is receptive for excitations of its spontaneity, and none is spontaneously effective without having received these "excitations".

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[1] John Stuart Mill furnishes an example of this style of reasoning. In his Logic, Bk. III, chap. 21, he treats of the origin of the law of causation. He begins his remarks by noting the fact that the whole method of induction rests upon the presupposition of the law of universal causation. And then he asks the question, whether this is a *petitio principii?* He calls to mind the reply of the Scottish school (Reid, and Sir. W. Hamilton,) that the principle of causation is a principle which the human mind cannot help believing, and which must therefore be assumed as true, and says that this is no proper reply. For *belief* is not *proof*, and this principle requires proof. To rejoin with the Scottish school that the latter assertion involves an appeal to the mind against itself (which is substantially the reply of *Lotze*) is in Mill's view to give no solution of the difficulty, for it is a notorions fact that belief may come from association of ideas (Hartley, James Mill) and may be so strong that arguments will not shake it, or may have the appearance of a necessity of thought. We demand evidence for this principle, and evidence is that which *ought* to control the mind, not necessarily that which *does* control it.

Mill's answer to his own question is as follows: — The principle of causation is itself capable of proof, and is actually arrived at in a way which affords sufficient proof for it. It is itself a case of *inductio per enumerationem simplicem.* We perceive that when the spark is applied to the powder, the latter explodes; that when the water is heated, the salt which was insoluble in it when cold, dissolves; that when a weight rests upon the earth, it displaces the particles of the earth's surface &c. &c.; that, in fact, the world is connected in pairs of invariable antecedents and consequents. Now, this invariability of the succession of antecedent and consequent, we find to be true of the greatest number of phenomena. In those cases in which we do not know that it is true, it is of the peculiar difficulties in the way of observation. And cases are continually passing from the latter of these two classes into the former, so that the law of causality in respect to them becomes evident. And even many cases which we do not yet fully understand, do in *some* cases obey the known laws of nature. Accordingly the evidence is well nigh universal, and the largeness of the observation is an evidence of the reliability of the law, though it is obtained through this inferior method of induction, "per enumerationem simplicem".

In accordance with our presupposition we must define the origin of our ideas as follows: — (1) Every supposition is incorrect which lays the origin of our knowledge entirely in the object. The nature of the subject is operative as well as that object, just as when a wax tablet is written upon, the qualities of the wax whereby it is capable of displacement, and of readily retaining the form given to it, are as necessary as the qualities of the style by which it is able to displace the particles of the wax. (2) While the contribution of the object to our knowledge may be wanting, as, for example, when two ideas suggest a third which is not contained in the object producing the former, the contribution of the subject to the knowledge produced can *never* be wanting. (3) The result of both elements, subject and object, that is, the complete knowledge, is none the less entirely a priori. The product is an *idea*, not the *being* of which it is the idea, and as an idea, is a product of the soul's activity, and of that alone. It is not produced *without reference* to the object, but it is the product of the subject. The reflection of an object in a mirror, depends entirely upon the qualities of the mirror. But much more, since the image in the mirror forms to the eye only a substitute for the object, does the perception which the soul has of the object, or of the reflected object, require an activity of the soul itself, which is entirely conditioned by the nature of the soul. Or, to take another example, — "it has been accepted on all sides that we do not see a causal connection between two events, that, rather, the idea of such a connection is added by us to the succession in time which we perceive, at one time in order to secure to the causal idea through this a priori origin, the higher dignity of a necessary and general truth, and at another in order to deny to it all validity in reference to the world of things from the perception of which it does not arise. Both conclusions are incorrect. In reference to the second, I repeat the simple consideration that *if* a causal connection took place between the events of the outer world, it could not be exhibited to us as the immediate object of a perception which should hold itself perfectly passive. The kind of connection between single impressions can never be any thing more than an *occasion* to us to add by thought the causal connection, and this occasion can only be effective when it is inevitably necessary to our mental nature to complete and justify that connection of the manifold in our consciousness through this supplementation" (p. 522).

But this extended apriority is only one side of the matter. The ground of the peculiar employment of the powers of our minds exclusively in this or that way, cannot lie in the mind itself alone. We observe only certain definite figures in space at a given time. We cannot change the colors which we perceive, at our will. Now events suggest irresistibly to us the idea of a causal connection, now they exclude such an idea. The *combination* of occasions to the use of our apriori faculties which are given to us, cannot be grounded in the general nature of our mind. It may be that there is an exterior world of matter from which they arise, it may be that this supposition is incorrect. It is not necessary to decide that now. But it is certain that, from whatever source it may arise, there is an empirical, or a posteriori element of our knowledge. Accordingly within this empirical world there is a positive body of laws, independent of us, and which may properly form the object of our investigations, which must be settled upon before we think of an application of them without the realm of immediate experience to the determination of the existence or non-existence of a world of matter, and of its nature.

Our experiences are forced upon us from without, and we cannot think them other than they are given to us. It is accordingly true that the a posteriori form of thought is unchangeable. It is equally true that the laws imposed upon thought by our nature are unchangeable. They are the result of experience in so far as they do not become objects of knowledge until they enter, upon occasion of experience, into our consciousness, but when they enter it is under the form of *general and necessary truths*. They appear to us as axiomatic in their character, and when once they have been presented to us, we declare that they will always remain valid, thus anticipating experience upon the anthority of the evidence they give for themselves (p. 526 cf. 258). They are not supported by any higher law confirming their validity, and they cannot be, for such a law would be no more evident than they, and if their evidence is not enough to secure their validity for all time, no such evidence could be given, and the thought of a general truth is reduced to an impossibility. When now it is claimed by the advocates of experience that this is the case, and that consequently we learn the general validity of these principles only through experience, observing as we do that they confirm themselves in many successive cases, and thus concluding according to the law of probability that they will always hold true, it should he further noted that "if, as is claimed, the evidence of a thought given by experience at one moment is to give no security for the experience of the same evidence at a second moment, then the same experience repeated a thousand times will not make the appearance of the thousand and first more probable than that of the second, or the third was" (p. 527). In all reasoning and investigation we are compelled at some point to presuppose some one of those self-evident, necessary, and general thoughts which go before all experience.

§ 32. Let us pause for a moment at this point to take a review of the results gained.

The principle of causality according to *Lotze* is a *necessary presupposition* which we make in all our investigations and reasonings, because we are obliged by the nature of our mind to make it, and which possesses immediate evidence, and universal validity. This character it shares with many other principles of reasoning. If we try to escape them, we find it impossible. If we will investigate them, no sooner do we subject them to examination than in examining them, we make a fresh employment of them. If we seek auxiliary evidence for their truth, they are so plain that they cannot be made plainer, and so certain that no criterion could give equal certainty except by coalescing with them.

This lies in the line of a development of the Kantian doctrine, and makes a considerable advance upon *Kant*. The distinguishing mark of necessity and universality serves, as with *Kant*, to direct our attention to the a priori principles, but a scientific reason is given why this is a reliable sign of them, which *Kant* failed to do, and the derivation of them from experience, professedly made by the empirical school, is shown to be impossible. In essence, the two writers present the same proof. *Kant's* "experience", to constitute which the a priori principles are necessary, is the ripened product of thought, and this product can never be secured, according to *Lotze*, except the a priori principles be employed at every step. *Kant's* argumentation is apparently more rigorous, but it is greatly complicated, while *Lotze's*, though simpler, is on that very account, more convincing.

Lotze brings the necessity of his fundamental presupposition to the sharpest expression, in that he formulates the principle of causality, and presents it as the basis upon which he rests his whole theory of knowledge. This exhibits it as the fundamental principle in his philosophy. But more than this: he so defines it that it becomes the source from which the necessary and complete a-priority of other truths of the same class would follow, even if they did not have the conclusive evidence of axiomatic character. On the other hand, it might seem that this definition excluded the idea of efficient causation, for no real operation of one object upon another seems possible. This difficulty we shall find removed later. We have to note further that the definition is not given in such a way that we could express it after the usual form: *Every event* must have a cause. The more general expression: Every event must have a *ground,* would not be denied. *Lotze* speaks of a causal connection between the things given in our experience, yet not necessarily in the former sense. The force of these observations will appear more clearly in the sequel, in which he treats of freedom, to which we leave other definitions of causation given by *Lotze.*

§ 33. Over the other parts of the Logic we will not linger. Much space is devoted to an interesting discussion of the world of ideas in connection with Plato's theories, which serve to bring out the thought that the world of ideas has an independent and real *validity*, whether material objects corresponding to them exist or not. In mastering the world presented to us in our sensations &c. certain a priori principles are necessary, among which the most important are: the possibility that any individual idea may remain without realisation in the world of things; the presupposition of a general reign of law in the course of events; the necessity of a priori principles for the comprehension even of the empirical laws of the world (p. 565 ff.).

To this point we have remained entirely within the phenomenal world. The question has not yet been raised whether there is a world of things exterior to, and independent of our perceptions and ideas, or not. We now pass into the "Metaphysics", in which the world forms the object of investigation, and yet we find ourselves in some perplexity when we seek to establish definitely the process by which *Lotze* passes from the one world into the other. Is it by a process of reasoning from the existence of spiritual impressions to their causes in an external world? So it would seem from certain expressions he employs.[1] It is the less important that he should speak distinctly upon a so very probable point, because he certainly assumes the existence of the external world, and lays down the principle of causality as the chief means of penetrating to the reality and meaning of that world. Experience in itself gives us no knowledge of the existence of the world, and yet the a priori laws cannot be valid for the internal connection of phenomena, without also holding good for the unknown ground from which the phenomena arise. And when any assertion is made, we must judge it according to the self-evident and immediate principles of our own minds. Upon these principles *Lotze* proceeds in the following chapters to employ the law of causality most accurately and constantly, and seeks thereby to penetrate to the most secret recesses of the nature of things. His position on the whole seems to be this: The question before the philosopher is how to secure the completeness and consistency of our whole range of thought, and the supposition of the existence of the external world is necessary to this.

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[1] For example, the description of the process by which men in general come to the conclusion that there is a world of things independent of us, p. 25, Met. Cf. p. 569, Log. for a similar thought.

Only one more point is it necessary to mention here, viz. *Lotze's* starting point, and the clue he follows in his investigations. This is the common experience and natural opinions of the race. These have already performed in a rough way the work of the metaphysician, and so *Lotze* with *Herbart* selects them as his starting point, so that philosophy is also to him the "revision of our ideas".

§ 34. We pass hastily along, and do not pause over the definition of being, of quality, and of the real. Suffice it to say that *Lotze* rejects all those attempts to define the independent being lying at the basis of phenomena which have explained it as absolute, or lying outside of all relation. It is its very being to exist in relations, and although the idea of the absolute is a correctly formed idea, and as an abstraction may have value, it has no reality. In the same way, the idea of a single unchangeable quality (*Herbart*) constituting the essence of a thing, is an impossible idea, and *Lotze* presents many reasons against it. So far from supposing an unchangeable substance lying at the base of things, which receives variable qualities, he says expressly that the qualities are alone unchangeable (p. 62) and rejects entirely the idea of substance, and defines finally a thing as a group of qualities connected by a rule, or as "the individual law of its conduct brought into realization" (p. 79. "*das verwirklichte individuelle Gesetz seines Verhaltens*").

To this point the process of the argument rests upon the idea of causality, and upon the mutual consistency of all objects of thought as these principles are ordinarily conceived. A closer examination would present nothing new to us in our especial investigation. We enter now upon the subject of change, and therefore more closely upon the subject of causality, and shall find an exposition of the reasons which led *Lotze* above to define the principle as he did (pp. 84—134).

§ 35. Were there no change in our impressions, or did the supposed world of things suffer no change, and exhibit no motion, there would never arise an occasion for the supposition that there are things in which, or upon which change takes place without destroying their permanent character. Our attention is therefore demanded by this phenomenon which carries such consequences to our thinking with it. What is meant when it is supposed that a thing a undergoes a succession of changes whereby it becomes α^1, α^2, α^3 &c.? The idea of change is intended to exclude the idea of development of something out of nothing. It is conceived as only the continuation of a former reality in a new form. Yet since only the *contents* of the new can be contained in the contents of the old, and since the reality of the new is not the reality of the old, but rather presupposes the destruction of the latter as its own proper beginning, the new is *developed* in the precise sense which it is sought to avoid in the use of the word change. Accordingly the possibility of development is forced upon us as a subject of investigation. What it is in itself, it is however impossible to define, or to explain by an actual construction, and so we are compelled to receive it as a given fact of the order of nature (p. 87). In so far as it may be found to contradict the idea of the permanence (*Beharrlichkeit*) of being, we must seek an explanation of both, which shall reconcile them with one another. No wholly irregular process of development may be assumed as such an explanation, for this would both contradict our observation of phenomena, which follow evident laws, and also render investigation wholly useless, for investigation necessarily presupposes regularity and order in that which is investigated.

Now, under the supposition that a thing a contains in itself the ground in consequence of which it becomes α, and which excludes the possibility of its becoming β, we have to ask the question how it comes to pass that the matter does not rest here, but that the α which is thus defined really enters into being. In thought we pass from the ground to its consequence of necessity. But how is it that, just as in thought we pass from a to α, so in reality a becomes α? We must not conceive of the matter as if the laws of thought were a necessary form to which the actual things were obliged to adapt themselves, and say that because the processes of the mind result so and so, it is self-evident that the reality will proceed in this way, and not that. The only possible supposition which will render the matter intelligible is that things follow the laws of thought not as an external force to which they are subjected, but because this is the interior necessity of their own being. The real nature of things is the first and the only true existence, the necessary laws of thought are reflections of it (p. 93).

If we seek to find the secret of this interior necessity, it is evident that we cannot regard the development as a succession of individual steps, separated from one another by intervals, any more than motion is produced from a series of motionless elements. The one step passes over into the next, so that the second is developed out of it. For in the observation of real phenomena what we perceive is a process of change in which there is evidence of positive influence from one body upon another.

Here we perceive the close connection of this subject with the doctrine of causality. *How* it arises that a change in one object should determine the change of another object, we do not yet understand, but certainly if it were commanded by some external power that the latter should govern itself according to the conduct of the former, this would never take place unless such a command were entirely unnecessary, and unless the nature of the second led it of itself to perform that which was prescribed by the command (p. 98). If now, this incomprehensible change has occurred, and the second object has taken on its new form, it will for all time pursue a different path from what it would otherwise have pursued. *How* it shall continue to exist, we do not discuss at this point. But as to the origin of its further course, *Lotze* says, we find our difficulties solved by the supposition of immanent development. *What* this is, we cannot understand. It is fully incomprehensible. But since it occurs *within* an object which possesses unity, it presents no conceptions which render it *in*conceivable, and consequently *Lotze* adopts it without question.

§ **36.** The definite nature of the development of every object is determined by the character of the last change it may have undergone. We are thus driven back upon the consideration of transeunt causality. We found that this involved the consideration of development, and now we find that the consideration of development involves this.

Lotze begins here by correcting the ordinary idea of cause. It is not possible that the entire character of the change should be referred to the cause in distinction from the element in which the change is produced. The body which receives the operation of the cause, has itself a nature, which must join in determining the result, or else the cause, instead of operating as a cause creates the result by an arbitrary exercise of its own powers. Now, such an idea is impossible in the present world. It would be a matter of entire indifference whether the absolute commands of such a cause were imposed upon C, D, or E, F. The result, depending wholly upon the cause, must be the same in either case. But this is not the fact, for often that which is produced by operation upon C, D could not occur in E, F. A closer definition of terms is necessary. *Cause* is therefore defined with *Herbart,* as all those real things whose connection with one another when once brought into being, leads to the occurrence of facts, which were not before in existence. The *ground* is the nature of all the relations existing between the things and their natures out of which the contents of the new fact follow as a necessary result. We must add to this as the *condition* of the operation of the cause, a veritable *relation,* into which the things comprising the cause must enter (p. 105f). The latter may be illustrated in case of the explosion of powder by a heated body, by the *proximity* of the heated substance to the powder.

The topic which demands metaphysical explanation is this *relation* in which subjects require to stand before the operation of causality takes place. *Lotze* here declares himself against *Herbart's* supposition of a "*Zusammen*" of the ultimate monads. *Herbart* illustrates it by the idea of proximity in space, but *Lotze* asks the further question *how* it is brought to pass that when the objects are thus near in space they come to take notice of each other, and to conduct themselves with reference to each other. Another explanation of the difficulty is attempted in the supposition of an *influence* which the active element exerts upon the passive. But the question is, how can one object exert an influence upon another? It is not by the transition of a substance from one object to another, When, for example, we suppose an actual cause to pass from one body to another, as water from a drying substance to one that is becoming moist, the difficulty is not thus resolved, but the question remains, *how*, when the water has passed from the first to the second, does it in the second exert its influence upon it? So, it has been proposed to explain causality through the passage of a *quality* from one body to another. But how is this possible? Can the quality of one body detach itself from this body, become the quality of no body, there transfer itself from this nothing, and become the quality of the second body? Or, allowing this to be possible, how can it be determined in which direction this quality thus detached from any body should go? If it takes the direction of a definite body, then there must be an operation of this body upon it, in order to produce this determination, and accordingly here you have the same question started afresh, how can this second body exert an influence upon the disembodied quality? Or, allowing this to be possible, what would the quality do when it arrived at the second body? That it should be fastened upon this would require a special operation of the body upon it, which suggests the original question still again, — or being fastened upon it, how could it become one of the qualities of this body? (§ 56).

Pursuing this idea still further, the reception of the quality by the second body seems to imply that it affords a place to it because it is itself *similar* to the body from which the quality originally detached itself. This leads to the idea of the necessary similarity of bodies which exercise upon one another a causal influence. This view is not only unfounded, but has been exceedingly injurious in the history of philosophy (§ 60). Our previous discussions leave upon us the necessary conviction that nothing is passive or receptive in the sense that it can receive any quality from another thing, but for everything which is to arise in it as a quality, there is a previous essential and indispensable condition in its own nature. The result of every process of mutual causation between A and B is always the production of a Z in accordance with the necessity with which Z is produced out of A under the operation of B, and out of B under the operation of A. Because the determining ground of the possibility of the effect lies in the so-called receptive, as fully as in the so-called active element, these mutual causes may be similar to one another, or they may be fully dissimilar.

Reducing now all these investigations to their simplest result, *Lotze* says that the operation of cause and effect consists simply in this, that the reality of one quality is the condition of the realization of another (p. 136). This connection between qualities we have already seen to be conceivable where it is thought of as existing within one and the same being, and described as an immanent operation, but we have found it wholly inconceivable when it is thought of as a transeunt operation. The latter view then we are compelled to give up, and with it that upon which it is founded, viz. the idea of a world consisting of a multitude of independent things, the being of which consisted in their standing in relation to one another. There can be no plurality of things independent of one another, but all elements between which a mutual relation of cause and effect is to appear, must be considered as parts of one only true being. In this way our original plurality gives way to a monism, and the transeunt causal operation, which is inconceivable, gives way to the idea of immanent causation (p. 137). The sum of all things must be regarded as the one, unchangeable, infinite being in which they exist, and the expression of whose power, or whose thoughts, they are. Wherever change takes place in one element of this infinite being, a corresponding change takes in another in order that its unchangeability may be preserved. To express it in mathematical form: $M = \varphi\,[ABRST] = \varphi\,[abRST] = \varphi\,[a, brsT]$ &c. &c. (cf. 138, 139 with 141) where M is the "one being", and A B R S &c. are different elements of it, so that when one (A) changes to *a*, some other like B must change to *b* &c. &c.

Lotze does not present this as mere hypothesis to explain the difficulties of causation, but rather as the real meaning of our thoughts, "that which we *really think* so soon as we make clear to ourselves what we really mean by the mutual relations of cause and effect" (p. 140). When an object A passes into a form *a* under which it is the cause of a second object, B, taking the form *b*, *a* is not merely a form of A *for* A, but at the same time *for* B, and *b* in like manner, *for* A. Now, what is this For-one-another, in which these forms *a* and *b* stand, except that A and B are not two existences separated from one another, and independent of each other, but that they are united into a oneness in which their differences are only different manifestations of one and the same? This is that infinite, that one power in which all things exist as its modifications.

We may conveniently refer in this connection to *Lotze's* doctrine as to the relation of time to causality. He teaches emphatically the transcendental validity of time, in opposition to *Kant* (Met. p. 268 ff.), in the following form: The course of time is reality which we cannot deny. But there is no "vacant time" which flows on in distinction from the events of this world, and into which the latter have to enter. The events themselves, with their full meaning and contents, are that which passes over from nothingness into being, and from being into nothingness. Were there no change there could be no time, and if there were no time there could be no change. Change is the operation of causes, and thus the principle of causality stands in an intimate connection with the fact of time. There can be no *perceptions of effects* on our part without time, and no continuous operation of causality without time. Yet it does not follow that the operation of causality essentially presupposes *lapse* of time, but rather the express contrary, for if the universe may be represented by the equation

$$M = \varphi\, [A B R S T\ \&c.],$$

unless the first infinitesimal change in A is compensated by a perfectly contemporaneous change in B, the equation is for ever destroyed, and with it the universality of the law of causation.

§ **37.** Let us throw a glance back upon the course of our studies hitherto before proceeding to ask those final questions which shall define the whole theory of causation as it lay in *Lotze's* mind. *Lotze* starts from the presupposition of the competence of our powers. This carries with it the necessity of assuming without proof all those truths which press themselves upon the mind as the necessary laws of its thought, among which is to be found the law of causation. This principle *Lotze* sets forth as a frank and open presupposition, and that in a particular form. To this point his reflections are confined explicitly to the inward world of our ideas. But now by the help of the principle of causality, *Lotze* passes over into the world of reality lying beyond our ideas. This he finds embraced in a rough system of metaphysical thought, the common ideas of the race. With this as his starting point, he proceeds boldly to investigate the nature of being, of the real, and of causation, at every step of which he employs the presupposition with which he started out. Relying upon it, and upon the necessary laws of thought he pursues his latest investigation, that of the nature of transeunt causation, and here develops that peculiar course of thought which lay at the foundation of his first definition of causation. Relying still upon this principle he pushes onward until he believes himself to have found the true secret of the material world, and all its chains of causation in the immanent processes of one infinite being.

He teaches then, in the most pronounced way, the doctrine of the transcendental use of causality, that we may *know* about things, and that not only *that they are,* and as we begin to see already in the doctrine of one infinite being, *that God is,* but also, at least to some extent, *what* things are.

It only remains for us to consider the details of his doctrine, and particularly, first to ask the question, does he teach a really *efficient* causation?

§ **38.** The ideas we ordinarily attach to efficient causation imply first an absolute beginning of action. If an event is so connected with the chain of events that it is merely a *link* therein; and as fully determined by that which precedes, as that which follows determined by it, it is not the product of efficient causation. Efficient causation must therefore proceed from a free will. It is also implied in this idea that there should be intelligence and motive, as well as mere consciousness, in the cause. That is, the whole idea of personality is involved. As all operations of causality are only the immanent causation of the one great being M, they must all be, in an eminent sense examples of efficient causation, if this being has freedom and personality. And if man has the same freedom, his actions may also be called operations of efficient causation. Our question therefore resolves itself into the further one, as to what *Lotze's* doctrine as to the human will, and the personality of God is.

The most useful passage upon the freedom of the will is Mikrokosmus, I. p. 288ff. The freedom of the will is here stated in the most decided manner. It is a *conviction* of the human soul, and it is so strong and essential, that if there should be a conflict between it and the principle of causality, the latter must undergo modification rather than it.

All the real proof which *Lotze* gives of his position is contained in these few words, but this is a style of proof entirely in accordance with his whole system. The freedom of the will is a demand of the whole soul of man, of his intellect, his feelings, and his moral nature, and these elements it is *Lotze's* constant effort to satisfy. It is one of the common ideas and irresistible convictions of the race, and has in this a sufficient proof of its truth unless there be found substantial reasons in its unthinkability, for modifying it. True, it cannot be proved by observation of the processes of our minds (I, p. 161ff.) in opposition to the supposition of the control of motives over the will, for after every decision, the motive chosen would *appear* to have had an antecedent strength by which it became the determining cause. Although our response to the excitations of outward objects is different in different cases, still there remains the idea of irritability which involves the essential idea of causality, and we do not always know all the conditions which may have joined to produce a given result. And finally, the proof from moral considerations cannot be urged too strongly, for it is not generally accepted. *Yet,* however intimate the connection between the outer event and the inner process of volition, there is no proof that the former is the conditioning cause of the latter. And if no further reasons than these can be found against the supposition of the freedom of the will, it must be allowed to stand.

The great argument which will be advanced against freedom, and which *Lotze* considers here, is the universality of causation (I, 291). He has himself already established this fact both in more general form (Log. pp. 567, 570), and by a careful consideration of phenomena after the manner of the natural sciences (Mik. I, ch. 1, 2). According to this principle it is claimed that all things stand in a mutual relation of cause and effect, and that consequently an event cannot take place within the realm of nature which is not fully determined by preceding causes. *Lotze's* reply is, first, that in all schemes which set out to explain nature, it is necessary to presuppose an original existence, and one original motion. Without these nothing can be explained. But this is to suppose a point at which the series of cause and effect begins, that is, where an event occurs which is not determined by its antecedents in the same sense in which it determines its consequents. Now, why should this idea be confined to the entrance of one original, uncaused act into the universe, to the exclusion of the possibility of the entrance of subsequent acts of the same sort, which when they had once entered, should submit to the causal order of the system? The law of causation is really that every *effect* has a cause, but what justifies us in considering *everything,* without exception, as an *effect?* And, he somewhere adds, the explanation of the world, when one begins with freedom, demands causality, because, if anything is to be accomplished in the world, a free will must be able to reckon confidently upon an infallible connection of cause and effect, whereby the first fact which his action produces, will produce infallibly a second, and a third &c. But if we begin with an idea of rigid causality, freedom is excluded. And hence that view of the world is to be preferred which starts from the supposition of freedom, because it is the more comprehensive.

Here then in the nature of man is laid the foundation for a true efficient causality in the world.

§ 39. *Lotze* teaches equally clearly the doctrine of the personality of God, and that the world is created by him in the sense that it is a production of his will alone (Mik. III, p. 593). He does not, like *Herbart,* derive his main argument for the existence of God from the teleological argument, but more in accord with the spirit of his whole philosophy, he refers again to one of the common ideas of men, the religious idea, and examines this in the light of its ability to satisfy the demands not only of the merely reasoning faculties of man, but also his conscience and his feelings. The existence and personality of God are "an immediate certainty" to man. "The greatest, most beautiful, and worthy, cannot be a mere thought, but must be a reality, *because it would be unendurable in itself* to believe of the *ideal,* that it is a representation which the mind produces by its processes, but which in reality, has no existence, no power, and no validity (III, 561). And he compresses the whole argument into one sentence, which, as it forms a kind of summit and capstone of his whole system I quote in the original: *Wäre das Grösste nicht, so wäre das Grösste nicht, und es ist ja unmöglich, dass das Grösste von allem Denkbaren nicht wäre.* The common idea of men, thus established upon his deepest instincts and unrefuted by any valid objection, is accepted by *Lotze* as the truth.

Lotze thus leaves the teleological argument, and the principle of causality as involved in it, for what he regards as a more satisfactory proof. He has however examined this argument, and suggests certain criticisms upon it. He makes certain demands of it which are necessary to make it a convincing argument in his view, and which he declares it unable to fulfil. The first is that it should show that there is in the world a teleological system which *cannot* arise from an unintelligent and purposeless combination of powers, but *must* be the product of intelligence. We think that *Herbart* has sufficiently answered this claim of *Lotze* when he says that the *possibility* of the present arrangement of the world without the intervention of intelligence *is the necessary condition of its realization by such an intervention.* The question is: Which view, of intelligent or unintelligent, purposeless origin, is the more reasonable? The Iliad of Homer is composed of a certain number of letters arranged in a certain way. It could have been thus arranged by chance, for if not, it could never have been arranged at all. But who will believe that it was? *Lotze* indeed agrees to some extent with *Herbart* for he says (Mik. III, 557): "It may therefore be in a very high degree improbable, but it still remains possible, that the course of nature should have taken of itself and without purpose, all the steps", which have been taken in the world.

The second demand is that the argument should prove that the evidences of purpose should appear, not merely here and there, scattered throughout the world, but in all places, and without exception. Of this, he thinks, our knowledge is not competent. "How much appears to us quite inexplicable, aimless, even obstructive of aims we should otherwise suppose." "The few brilliant examples of harmony recognizable by us at least partially, which are chiefly afforded us by the animal kingdom, may well strengthen our faith in God, when we have once gained it, and our conviction that the one, same wisdom may also work according to purposes in that which we do not yet understand; but to gain this belief for the first time, in the face of whatever opposition, our empirical knowledge of the evidences of purpose in the material world, does not offer us sufficient means" (III, 558).

The third demand is that the teleological argument should show that creative wisdom in the performance of its objects never experiences opposition and is never compelled to produce that which is unimportant for its purposes. Only in this way can the divine wisdom be at the same time omnipotent. But this demand is by no means in accordance with our ordinary observation of nature; and further we can scarcely comprehend how a purpose can come into realization except by thinking of an independent material which it employs to produce this realization.

The last demand is for a proof of the unconditioned worth, and the holiness of the purposes which we actually see displayed in the government of the world. That this proof can never be given is evident from the strife of public opinions, and from the acknowledged mystery of the origin of evil.

Because, then, it cannot fulfill these demands, the teleological argument "is deprived of all cogent force, how great soever the undeniable effectiveness may be with which it unites the best of our knowledge of the world to confirm our faith" (III, 559).

Lotze's criticism of the kosmological proof is, in a word, that the ordinary phraseology employed in presenting it, viz. that the existence of a dependent and imperfect world proves the existence of a necessary and perfect being, is incorrect, and that when it is rightly stated, viz. that the dependence and dependent necessity of the world prove the existence of a Being which exists without being conditioned by others, and is the sufficient ground of all reality, proves the *unconditioned,* but not even the existence of only *one* such unconditioned, much less the existence of a God in the full sense of that word.

It will be noticed that in the above objections, aside from the formal objections to the kosmological argument, only two elements are urged, the limits set us by our *ignorance* and the impossibility of a *demonstrative proof.* The application of the principle of causality is not an object of criticism, only its ability to carry us to our aim, viz. to the proof of the existence of a personal God, in the full Christian meaning of that word, which shall not be open to any doubt. To us, this does not destroy the worth or usefulness of these arguments. *Lotze* himself can offer no more satisfactory proof, for his great resource is the "immediate certainty" which men have, and yet there have been atheists and doubters in all ages of the world. Practically, then, this certainty is not a universal one, and therefore does not present a "cogent" argument which can *force* us to believe. Indeed to most investigators it would seem to lack all proving power, and to have far more the character of a *"petitio principii"*. We do not think it is this. But if freedom from *all* objections is the test of a valid argument, then *Lotze's* is not such a one, and it will be difficult to find any in the world upon any subject outside of the mathematics.

In teaching the personality of man and of God, and the freedom of the will, *Lotze* teaches most conclusively a doctrine of efficient causation, and thus, in the full sense of the words, a transcendent use of this category.

§ **40.** The services of *Lotze* and his contribution to the solution of our problem may be estimated as follows: — We have found in his writings for the first time a clear and convincing statement of that primary supposition which philosophy must make, if it will give a systematic and complete view of its subject. Our object in philosophizing is, according to him to bring all our thoughts into a self-consistent system. Such a system is the truth. If truth is to be distinguished from this, it is not our object to attain truth, but since in fact the word truth has no meaning aside from this we are justified in presupposing that the result when obtained will be the truth. The above formulation of our object involves the further supposition that those elements of our thought which are necessary to us, and common to all men, are to be accepted by us without further question of their claims. And if, for example, the supposition of an external world of matter is found to be necessary to bring harmony into our thoughts, this supposition is to be accepted as true. Now, here, in these opening sentences, our main problem is already substantially solved.

By comparing *Lotze* with his predecessors we may see how great is his advance upon this point. *Kant* had only a glimpse of the proper starting point of philosophy. The father of idealism for Germany, he did not occupy so idealistic a standpoint as the ideal-realist *Lotze.* He perceived there were certain necessary thoughts, but they assumed to him very different worth. To some, because necessary to make experience, he gave the highest place of authority and validity. To another he gave only a "practical" value. To others he assigned a merely formal position. His system consequently may be described as a system of *disharmony* in our thoughts. *Herbart* advanced somewhat toward the goal, in that he gave some correct ideas as to the proper presupposition of philosophy, but he did not satisfactorily formulate them.

In his method of reasoning we owe much to *Lotze*. *Kant* established certain principles, but it was painfully, by long and complicated processes of reasoning, and partially without a clear understanding of his own meaning. *Herbart* adds to their number, in that he includes the forms of experience as well as its matter in that which is given us. His method of reasoning, also, improves, in that it becomes more easy and convincing. *Lotze* however combines both views in a more perfect harmony than *Herbart*, and does it in a few simple sentences which have the clearness of axiomatic truths.

What we have here said becomes especially evident in respect to the treatment of causality. *Kant* formulates doctrine in the physical world, establishes its validity firmly, if with difficulties, but does not understand it fully, confounds transcendent and efficient causality with it, and fails to see that it is involved in any special difficulties. *Herbart* acknowledges the law in all its width of application, but becoming involved in the difficulties of the theme, fails to extricate himself without giving up many elements of the doctrine, and involving himself in contradictions as bad as those he avoids. *Lotze* first establishes the principle in his fundamental presupposition, formulates it in a way to command confidence and prepare for its practical use, meets the difficulties involved in it, rescues its essential elements and important consequences from them, and ends with a probable solution, after having contributed something to every one of those questions raised by our first study with *Kant*.

We reckon it to the positive merits of *Lotze's* system that the solution is what it is, a negative one. He removes the difficulties of transeunt causation by the supposition of immanent causation, and this, he says *so far as we know*, involves no contradictions. This enables us to rest in confident possession of the results he has given us, even if our difficulties have not all been cleared up by positive answers. In the present state of scientific and metaphysical reflection it is, perhaps, impossible to give a more definite answer. But we may look forward to the appearance of a philosopher who in further pursuance of our theme, shall make clear what is meant, and what is involved in that absolute change, or development which *Herbart* rejects as impossible, but which *Lotze* offers as the explanation of the universe. The hope for future progress in the doctrine of causality lies in this direction.

The final conclusion given us by our study is accordingly this: